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Abstract
The economics of bureaucracy (EOB) is a field of research that emerged from the public choice
movement in the mid-1960s through to the early 1970s. It entailed applying traditional
economic theories and modelling techniques to study decision-making in non-market
hierarchies that are often referred to as bureaucracies. The field was pioneered and codified by
Gordon Tullock, Anthony Downs, and William Niskanen in what may be called the ‘golden
age’ of EOB. Establishing EOB as a bona fide research domain was a challenging intellectual
enterprise due to the absence of a pre-existing conceptual framework to readily model
bureaucracies within the economics discipline and because the non-market domain was then
not usually considered to be a relevant subject for economists to study. Metaphors, analogies,
and other rhetorical devices therefore played an especially important role in generating and
justifying the nascent economic theories of bureaucracy proposed by the early EOB pioneers.
This thesis traces the evolution of EOB during these formative years. A ‘case study’ approach
is adopted to reconstruct the unique contributions of the three key EOB pioneers by placing
their innovations in historical context, elucidating their key propositions and models, and
analysing the rhetoric they employed to advance their theories. The most important contention
of the thesis is that the relative success of the different theories presented by the EOB pioneers
was, in part, due to the different metaphorical representations of bureaucracy deployed in their
works. It is also argued that the overwhelming success of Niskanen’s ‘budget-maximising’
model caused the theoretical insights of the other EOB pioneers to be neglected.
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Chapter 1: Introduction

Chapter 1: Introduction
1.1 Introduction
This thesis is devoted to tracing the historical evolution of the economics of bureaucracy (EOB
hereafter) in the years shortly after its initial founding. EOB entails the use of traditional
economic modelling techniques to analyse hierarchical structures that are not subject to market
forces and commonly known as bureaucracies. It may be viewed as a research domain within
the sub-discipline of economics that is known as public choice theory and in which traditional
economic modelling assumptions and techniques are applied to political or (more broadly)
collective institutions. Public choice theory as a research program was launched by James
Buchanan and Gordon Tullock in the late 1950s and early 1960s at the University of Virginia,
especially after the publication of their joint seminal text The Calculus of Consent in 1962. The
foundations of EOB were established shortly after in the mid-1960s through to the early 1970s
in what may be called the ‘golden age’ of EOB. The key texts in this golden age were written
by U.S. economists and include Tullock’s The Politics of Bureaucracy (1965), Anthony Downs’
Inside Bureaucracy (1967), and William Niskanen’s Bureaucracy and Representative
Government (1971). These EOB pioneers cross-fertilised each other’s ideas in the process of
developing their theories and acknowledged each other’s influence in their publications. The
intellectual conversation that emerged from these interactions established, by the early 1970s,
the vocabulary, accepted assumptions, and puzzles for later EOB economists to explore.
The history of the golden age of EOB is traced within the thesis through three case studies
devoted to the key EOB pioneers. In this introductory chapter I present the main purpose,
themes, and methods that drive the thesis. Certain complexities associated with the subject
matter are deliberately left to one side at this stage of the presentation if these can be better
developed, in detail, in the chapters of the thesis that follow. The chapter itself is constituted
by five main sections. In section 1.2 a brief account of the emergence of EOB is presented to
set the scene and thereby to orient readers in a way that allows them to navigate the rest of the
thesis. In section 1.3 the formal aims and key contentions of the thesis are delineated. In section
1.4 the subject matter of the thesis is justified by identifying gaps in the existing secondary
literature. In section 1.5 the research methods used in the thesis are reviewed. In section 1.6 the
structure of the chapter sequence is presented.
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1.2 Setting the Scene
This thesis, as mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, is about how a group of economists
in the 1960s and 1970s revolutionised our understanding of bureaucracy by applying economic
theory and modelling techniques to analyse decision-making in hierarchical organisations that
are not subject to market forces (and hereafter called non-market bureaucracies). 1 Before
formally articulating the aims, contentions, and methods of the thesis, however, some scenesetting is provided here to help orient the reader to the subject matter. The term ‘bureaucracy’
is widely used in both academic discourse and our daily speech. It tends to conjure up various
negative images, such as red-tape, rigid and cumbersome procedures, lack of innovation,
unresponsive officials, pointless box-ticking, and so forth. In everyday parlance, people often
exclaim the word to express their general frustration with increasingly complex administrative
systems that are perceived as overly hierarchical, convoluted, wasteful, dehumanising, and
even authoritarian. And yet, despite the lack of enthusiasm for bureaucracy in the popular mind,
it is widely accepted as an indispensable component of modern society. Indeed, bureaucracy is
pervasive throughout all spheres of society, from government and military bodies to private
corporations, charities and NGOs, and universities. These public and private bureaucracies, for
better or worse, supply and control an increasingly large proportion of resources, goods, and
information in our economy. As Mancur Olson (1991, p. 27) observed, there appears to be a
paradox in modern society whereby a continued demand for, and growth of, bureaucracy is
accompanied by a general lack of enthusiasm and even hostility toward it.
Bureaucracy as a field of research, as opposed to a term in general parlance, emerged over
many centuries, and the associated literature is now voluminous. These scholarly endeavours
were initially driven by the importance of bureaucratic administration to empires, kingdoms,
principalities and, finally, the modern state. Confucius, Niccolò Machiavelli, Woodrow Wilson,
John Stuart Mill, and Max Weber are just a few of the leading minds from history who have
made it a subject of study. In more recent times formal and systematic studies of bureaucracy
have been produced within the clearly demarcated disciplines of political science, sociology,
public administration, and organisational theory. 2 This division of intellectual labour has
1

Hierarchies are not directly subject to market forces since resources are allocated within the hierarchy via
commands rather than market price signals. The EOB pioneers also implicitly or explicitly excluded indirect
market forces by restricting the subject of study to hierarchical organisations that do not sell a good or service in
the marketplace or, at most, by considering only those divisions of hierarchical organisations whose contributions
to a final market value is difficult to discern (see chapters three through to six of this thesis).
2

For a history of the concept of bureaucracy see Martin Albrow’s seminal 1970 monograph. Merton et al. (1952)
is also worth consulting as it contains several ‘classic’ texts on bureaucracy, including selections from Max Weber,

2

Chapter 1: Introduction
resulted in a bewildering proliferation of propositions relating to bureaucracy that do not
always sit comfortably together. The divergence in the representation of bureaucracy is in part
due to the different methodologies employed in each discipline. An equally important reason
is, however, arguably a semantic confusion arising from the different meanings given to
‘bureaucracy’ across the disciplines. Sometimes it is used to refer to a large organisation, while
other times it is used to refer to specific features within an organisation. In some writings it is
used interchangeably with “civil service” or “public sector”, while in other contexts it denotes
a specific method of government or the routines of office administration. Some authors use it
to mean administrative efficiency, while other authors use it to convey the exact opposite.
Martin Albrow (1970, p. 13), in his survey of the usage of bureaucracy in academic literature,
contended that the term is defined with sufficient imprecision and variation across the
disciplines that “specialists in these neighbouring disciplines tolerate the existence of
completely incompatible concepts of bureaucracy without comment”. The only common
denominator among these scholars from these myriad disciplines, it seems, is their belief that
bureaucracy is an important subject matter for academic thought and research.3
Modern economists, by contrast, for many years did not employ the received theories and
techniques of their discipline to study bureaucracy. Their lack of engagement with this subject
matter is something of a paradox given the important role bureaucracies play in allocating
scarce resources to competing ends in a modern economy through public sector agencies and
large corporations. There seems to be at least two reasons for this neglect. First, mainstream
economists paid less attention to the institutional context of human action as their discipline
became increasingly formalised after the marginalist revolution from the 1870s onwards. This
is because although neoclassical techniques such as marginalist and equilibrium analysis
introduced greater analytical tractability to economics, they also incidentally excluded
phenomena that do not easily lend themselves to this type of representation. The institutional
arrangements that govern economic production and exchange were thereby relegated to the
background to such an extent that the economics discipline became “institutionally antiseptic”

Robert Michels, Herbert Simon, Philip Selznick, and Robert Merton. For a review of modern approaches to
bureaucracy in the social and political sciences see Krause and Meier (2003).
3

Fortunately, the present thesis need not be bogged down in definitional exercises, as important as they are. This
is because, as already conveyed in the introduction to this chapter, the objective of this thesis is to explain how
bureaucracy was introduced as a field of research within economics and as such the definition adopted at strategic
points in the thesis is the one chosen by the economist under examination. In any case, the definition only changes
at the margin as the analysis moves from Tullock to Downs to Niskanen, since each invariably adapted Weber’s
hierarchical conception of bureaucracy and emphasised its non-market characteristic for his modelling purpose.
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(Boettke, 2018, p. 944).4 After all, the mathematical relationship between average and marginal
values is invariably true in the case of both a firm’s production costs and the enrolment numbers
at a university. Institutional features, such as bureaucratic hierarchies, that govern activities
which are not always directly subject to market evaluation, and hence marginal calculations,
were especially excluded. Second, many economists from the early twentieth century onwards
became increasingly convinced that the free market alone fails to allocate resources efficiently
due to a range of market imperfections that they duly codified, such as externalities,
monopolies, the tragedy of the commons, and inadequate effective demand. They therefore
supported government intervention to correct for these market failures. Implicit in this analysis
was, strangely, the assumption that governments themselves do not fail. This belief included
the idealistic presumption that public officials, including bureaucrats, dispassionately pursue
the ‘public interest’. The result was that economists, using their pristine mathematical models
to analyse market failures and to justify bureaucratic intervention, suffered from a kind of
“analytical myopia” that blindsided them from investigating the (potentially mis-)allocative
processes within government and non-market bureaucracies (Jackson, 1982, p. vii).
Economists did not systematically analyse the way collective decisions were made, via the
state, until the public choice revolution in the late 1950s and early 1960s. The foundations for
this revolution were primarily laid by Buchanan and Tullock at the University of Virginia. This
yielded their landmark publication, The Calculus of Consent, in 1962, which launched the
dominant strand within the public choice movement known as the Virginia School. It
nonetheless should be emphasised that public choice precursors from Knut Wicksell to Duncan
Black have since been identified and contemporaries outside Virginia also made contributions
to the early public choice movement.5 Indeed, some early contributors to public choice worked

4
Boettke especially emphasised mathematical formalism as the reason for economists not engaging with
institutions. Note, however, that non-mathematical heterodox economists have also strangely failed to analyse
bureaucracies in a systematic fashion, even though certain features have been analysed with skill within the older
institutionalist tradition, such as ‘internal labour markets’ and the failure of ‘governance structures’ within large
corporations. One exception is Weber’s famous appraisal of bureaucracies (analysed in greater detail in the next
chapter), but this requires using the definitions of the historical school of economics in Imperial Germany to
present Weber as an economist! On the history and impact of mathematical formalism in economics see Mirowski
(1989), Weintraub (2002), and Morgan (2012). The advent of New Institutional Economics at the end of the last
century has also admittedly provided a portal through which institutions can enter mainstream economics.
5

William Mitchell (1988), for instance, identified three schools of public choice theory: the Virginia School led
by James Buchanan, Gordon Tullock and their colleagues, the Rochester School spearheaded by William H. Riker,
and the Bloomington School led by Elinor Ostrom at Indiana University. Mancur Olson’s (1965) ‘special interest
group’ approach at the University of Maryland and the Chicago political economy program launched by George
Stigler (1971a) could potentially be added to this list. See also Peacock (1992), Medema (2000, 2005), Mueller
(2004), Rowley (2004a), and Congleton (2018) for the historical roots of public choice theory.
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in almost semi-isolation, such as Downs, who published An Economic Theory of Democracy
in 1957. This thesis, however, is not devoted to a general history of public choice, and hence
only those elements of public choice that are important to EOB need be dwelt upon here. In
this regard, public choice in these early years rested on a few simple assumptions, two of which
figured prominently in EOB. The first is methodological individualism, which is the idea that
any observed social phenomenon is the result of individuals pursuing their perceived selfinterests rather than a functional product of another social entity. This means that any observed
government or political action is modelled as the result of individuals pursuing their perceived
self-interests through a collective decision-making process rather than in the marketplace or in
isolation. The second is behavioural symmetry, which is the idea that individuals do not cease
to pursue their perceived self-interest when they move from the market to non-market domains,
such as when they cease to be consumers or producers in the marketplace to act as voters,
politicians, or bureaucrats. The modus operandi of early public choice economists was, in short,
to examine the way the incentives faced by self-interested voters, politicians, and public
officials potentially cause political decision-making to do more harm than good.
EOB itself emerged in the mid-1960s through to the early 1970s as a sub-field within public
choice theory. The EOB of this period entailed the application of economic techniques,
including methodological individualism and the behavioural symmetry hypothesis, to the study
of the way agents pursue their self-interests specifically within non-market bureaucracies. The
non-market feature meant that state-run bureaucracies were especially targeted for analysis and,
indeed, bureaucratic divisions of private corporations were considered only if their contribution
to a final market value could not be easily identified. The key EOB texts, as mentioned in the
introduction, included Tullock’s The Politics of Bureaucracy (1965), Downs’ Inside
Bureaucracy (1967), and Niskanen’s Bureaucracy and Representative Government (1971).
The fact that two of these texts were written by scholars who had already made landmark
contributions to the core of public choice theory (i.e., Tullock and Downs) clearly signals the
way EOB was largely conceived within the still evolving public choice movement. In some
ways EOB pioneers simply shifted the primary public choice focus from the economic analysis
of electing politicians and designing policies in the collective decision-making process to the
economic analysis of the daily activities of individuals in non-market bureaucracies who,
among other things, are charged with implementing these policies. The conceptual
breakthroughs that were made in EOB in these foundational years were sufficiently innovative
and striking relative to the research that ensued that these years also constitute the golden age
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of EOB. The body of work that resulted from these research efforts also meant that a separate
sub-field could be identified by the early 1970s. This body of work provided the accepted terms,
assumptions, and puzzles that preoccupied later economists writing on EOB.
1.3 Central Aim, Scope, and Chief Contentions of the Thesis
The central aim of the thesis is to trace the historical evolution of EOB during its golden age
from the mid-1960s through to the early 1970s. This is achieved in three case studies devoted
to the leading EOB pioneers, namely, Tullock, Downs, and Niskanen. These case studies
reconstruct the unique contributions of each EOB pioneer by placing their innovations in
historical context, elucidating the key features of the conceptual frameworks they proposed,
and analysing the rhetoric they employed to advance these frameworks. These three foci –
context, conceptual framework, and rhetoric – underpin the key contentions that drive the
analysis and historical narrative in this thesis. These contentions are as follows.
Firstly, it is contended that the content of EOB, like any field of research, was shaped by the
historical context in which it was codified and, further, that the distinctive nature of each EOB
pioneer’s contribution is more easily identified once this context is reconstructed. It is, for
instance, argued that the EOB pioneers drew upon the concepts employed within the wider
public choice movement (such as the behavioural symmetry hypothesis), and, like the public
choice theorists, were motivated in part by their objection to the rapid growth of government
from the New Deal onwards. It is also argued that the conversation which eventually developed
between the EOB pioneers, as reflected in cross-citations and acknowledgements of influence,
permitted the cross-fertilisation of their ideas. Finally, it is argued that the EOB pioneers
developed their ideas in reaction to the prevailing notions of bureaucracy in public
administration and allied disciplines, which they dismissed as unrealistic, normative, and
lacking in analytical substance. To help establish this context, a brief review of the key
scholarly traditions that possibly influenced EOB is presented in chapter two of the thesis and
the specific context within which each EOB pioneer developed his ideas is presented in each
of the subsequent chapters devoted to the case studies.
Secondly, it is contended within this reconstruction that all three EOB pioneers emphasised
several of the same institutional and behavioural features within the conceptual frameworks
that they developed to make bureaucracy amenable to economic modelling.6 Specifically, each

6

A ‘conceptual framework’, in the context of this thesis, is constituted by simplifying assumptions relating to the
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EOB pioneer portrayed bureaucrats as rational economic agents who pursue their self-interests
within a bureaucratic organisation that does not derive the majority of its revenue by selling
products in the marketplace, or within a division of an organisation whose contribution to a
final market value is not easily identified; that is, in bureaucracies that are not directly subject
to market forces. These ‘non-market’ bureaucracies are therefore potentially subject to what is
now called a principal-agent problem in which the bureaucrats pursue their own interests rather
than the official objectives of the bureaucracy. It is further contended, however, that the EOB
pioneers also chose to emphasise some institutional and behavioural features that differed. On
the one hand, Tullock (1965) and Downs (1964, 1967) chose to emphasise features that gave
rise to hierarchical-distortion models in which an internal principal-agent problem manifests
itself when the self-interested bureaucrats distort the information up and down the lines of
communication within the bureaucratic hierarchy. On the other hand, Niskanen (1971) chose
to emphasise features that gave rise to a budget-maximising model in which an external
principal-agent problem manifests itself when the self-interested chief bureaucrat seeks an
excessive budget from the external sponsor who funds the bureau. Each of these EOB pioneers
also offered different explanations for why certain objectives were prioritised in the utility
function of the bureaucrat.
Finally, it is argued that the EOB pioneers sought to register their conceptual frameworks with
the audience of this period. Specifically, the divide between economics and the other social
sciences at the time meant that there were no pre-existing frameworks within which the logic
and techniques of economics could be employed to model bureaucracy. The EOB pioneers
therefore had to develop their own frameworks both to render bureaucratic behaviour
intelligible in the vocabulary of economics and to persuade economists that their novel
economic descriptions of a traditionally non-economic environment were plausible. This
entailed deploying metaphors, analogies, and other rhetorical devices to generate and legitimise
their pioneering economic analyses of bureaucracy. The extent to which this rhetoric registered
with contemporaries, in turn, partly determined the analysis that dominated EOB. It is argued,
for example, that Niskanen’s budget-maximising model quickly came to dominate EOB due,
in part, to the superior rhetoric he employed, and that this success unfortunately caused the
behaviour of bureaucrats and institutional features of bureaucracy that underpin the EOB models. This appellation
is self-consciously employed in relation to the work of the EOB pioneers without necessarily invoking the more
specific claims relating to knowledge production and scientific corroboration now associated with (Lakatosian)
research programs and (Kuhnian) paradigms. As it happens, and as shown in the thesis itself, each of the EOB
pioneers carefully demarcated their conceptual frameworks from the models that emerged from them.
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insights of the other EOB pioneers to be neglected.
1.4 Gaps in the Literature and Contributions
A systematic history of the intellectual development of EOB has yet to be written and there is
certainly no existing history distantly devoted to EOB that is guided by the contentions
reviewed in the previous section. There are nonetheless several publications that contain
narratives and commentaries which are relevant to the task of this thesis. First, the key
contributors to this domain have themselves shed light on the evolution of EOB in their
commentaries and encyclopaedia entries on both their own and their colleagues’ work (e.g.,
Niskanen, 2001, 2012; Tullock, 1977). Such memoir-cum-commentaries are, however,
episodic rather than systematic and do not sufficiently trace the development of EOB in its
historical context. Additionally, good but fragmented accounts of the emergence of EOB have
appeared in the journal literature (e.g., Castellanos & Cervantes, 2019; Thompson, 2008); in
the prefaces and introductions to the re-issues of the works of the key figures (e.g., Rowley,
2005); in the biographies and obituaries that followed the deaths of the key figures (e.g.,
Pennington, 2014; Shughart & Tollison, 2016; Wagner, 2012); and in the early surveys that
were issued from the late 1970s onwards once it was clear that EOB had emerged as a bona
fide research field within economics (e.g., Chang et al., 2001; Moe, 1997; Olson, 1991;
Orzechowski, 1977; Rowley & Elgin, 1988; Wintrobe, 1997). Note again, however, that these
valuable contributions invariably provide episodic accounts of EOB and their expositions of
the early texts are thin. This is especially true with respect to Tullock’s and Downs’ writings
on bureaucracy, both of which are often introduced as insightful but preliminary accounts that
were quickly superseded by Niskanen’s economic model of bureaucracy (e.g., Mueller, 2003,
p. 362; Niskanen, 2001).
The most extensive treatment of the history of EOB is perhaps the one presented in Alan
Peacock’s Raffaele Mattioli lectures titled Public Choice Analysis in Historical Perspective
(1992), in which he contextualised the now standard EOB model of the budget-maximising
bureau within a historical review of the possible reasons for the secular trend of rising public
expenditure (Peacock, 1992, pp. 57–62). He also reconstructed the rich conceptions of human
motivation and the individual’s utility function in the works of classical economists to critique
and extend the public choice perspective of bureaucracy (i.e., EOB).7 Nevertheless, Peacock

7

Peacock’s historical sensibility is partly the product of his close reading of classical economics and German and
Italian public finance literature that he undertook in the process of demarcating public finance as a sub-discipline
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did not closely examine the foundational texts of EOB other than Niskanen’s 1971 book and
thereby neglected the key contributions made by the other pioneers. For instance, although he
cited Tullock (1965) in his analysis of the budget-maximising model, he essentially conflated
Tullock’s and Niskanen’s ideas together (Peacock, 1992, p. 63). In any case, Peacock
ultimately sought to demonstrate the value of history of economic thought by showing how it
can inspire fresh theoretical developments in public choice. His narrative is therefore still of
some importance to this thesis, since in some ways this thesis is an attempt to elucidate the
history of EOB in the way advanced by Peacock to uncover any fresh or forgotten insights
applicable to modern EOB research.
It should also be emphasised that Peter Jackson, in The Political Economy of Bureaucracy
(1982), is of some value. Although he presented a less historically inclined narrative compared
to Peacock, his account constitutes one of the most comprehensive reviews of the variegated
approaches to the study of bureaucracy in organisational theory, political science, public
administration, and economics. Jackson (1982, p. 2) stated that he wished to “introduce the
economist to the issues, debates and controversies of bureaucracy which exist in other
disciplines and which will… throw some light upon the questions which economists ask about
bureaucracy”. Jackson’s seminal publication reminds us that economic theories do not arise in
an intellectual vacuum but are to some extent influenced by broader discussions in the social
sciences. By considering alternative approaches in surrounding disciplines contemporary to
EOB, Jackson provided some degree of contextualisation of EOB ideas and presented fresh
intellectual resources to broaden the economic analysis of bureaucracy. Like Peacock, however,
Jackson (1982, p. 7) did not closely examine the early texts that gave rise to EOB; nor did he
“draw out the intellectual antecedents of the economic analysis” contained in such works. He
did not, in short, provide a comprehensive history of the early development of EOB that both
faithfully reconstructs the theories and models presented by the EOB pioneers and sufficiently
accounts for the intellectual antecedents that possibly influenced its formation.
A gap in the literature therefore presents itself. There is scope for a systematic account of the
key publications of the EOB pioneers written between the mid-1960s and early 1970s, as well
as a review of the earlier scholarly works that formed the intellectual milieu which shaped the

in the Anglo-Celtic world in the 1950s (Peacock, 2010, p. 549). An early example of his efforts to map this terrain
is his co-authored (with R. A. Musgrave) Classics in the Theory of Public Finance (Musgrave & Peacock, 1958),
which included a translation of K. Wicksell’s A New Principle of Just Taxation by a young James Buchanan.
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way the pioneers developed and communicated their analyses. In consulting these sources, this
thesis extends the a-historical surveys, such as the one written by Jackson, by sketching the
historical context that gave rise to EOB, while deepening the limited historical accounts, such
as the one by Peacock, by analysing the analytical advances within the EOB specifically rather
than public choice theory more broadly. Corralling the historical particulars to corroborate the
key contentions delineated in the previous section will yield a faithful reconstruction of the
theories advanced by Tullock, Downs, and Niskanen, and, further, highlight any insights that
may have been neglected in the course of EOB’s history.
1.5 Research Method
The method of intellectual history adopted for this research project is driven by the central goal
of the thesis. As already mentioned, this goal is to gain greater insight into EOB by tracing the
development of EOB during the golden age of this research domain from the mid-1960s
through to the early 1970s. The key EOB concepts, theories, and models of this period are
treated as the product of a conversation that was led by Tullock, Downs, and Niskanen and
which was shaped by the intellectual milieu in which it took place. One of the key arguments
that runs through the spine of the thesis is that the power of the rhetorical tools deployed by
the main protagonists in this conversation registered with the wider economics community in
such a way that EOB was embraced as a suitable subject within economics. Given the vision
of this historical episode, a contextualist historiography is utilised to guide the ordering of the
historical particulars. The contextualist approach to the subject matter is particularly inspired
by three exegetical conventions: 1) the contextualist approach pioneered by Donald Winch,
Stephan Collini, and John Burrows (often referred to as the Sussex School); 2) the morelinguistically oriented contextualist approach popularised by Quinten Skinner (sometimes
known as the Cambridge School); and 3) the rhetoric of economics promoted by Deirdre
McCloskey. Elements will be drawn from each of these historiographical-cum-rhetorical
traditions in a selective fashion and without showing a slavish devotion to any one of them.
Consider each in turn.
The historical narrative of this thesis partly imitates the contextual approach promoted within
the ‘Sussex School’. It especially imitates their practice of “eavesdropping on the conversations
of the past” (Winch, 1996, p. 28).8 That is, rather than hastening to ‘interrogate’ past texts with

8

See also Collini et al. (2000).
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modern questions or anachronistically interpreting texts by imposing categories of our own,
emphasis is placed on recreating past events and conversations in a way that draws out the
questions, assumptions, and mental categories that were important for the historical agents.
This is to achieve a sympathetic reading of texts that avoids “the transgression of celebrating
or denigrating a text from the past to support or denigrate a larger ideological goal in the present”
(Moore, 2010, p. 90). In other words, the historical analysis of EOB presented in this thesis is
not designed to support or denigrate either a heterodox or an orthodox framework from the
present with the aim of reshaping modern economics to suit the author’s preferences. It should
nonetheless be emphasised that I do not slavishly adhere to the letter of the Sussex dictum that
all anachronistic terms should be avoided and, indeed, sometimes I deliberately use modern
terminology to convey an EOB insight if it better captures what the EOB author sought to
convey. Thus, for instance and as already conveyed, I broadly summarise the central EOB
claim that bureaucrats opportunistically exploit the ‘information asymmetry’ feature in nonmarket organisations to pursue their divergent interests under the banner of a ‘principal-agent’
problem, even though the EOB pioneers did not necessarily use this phrase. The key rider to
this approach is that the reader is always informed when a modern term is introduced and,
further, the intent of the author is not distorted by using this term.
The Sussex approach is complemented with Skinner’s linguistic-contextualist reading of texts.
The latter entails recovering the complex intentions of the author when writing for his or her
intended audience and interpreting each “utterance” in light of “the whole range of
communications which could have been conventionally performed on” any occasion or subject
(Skinner, 1969, p. 49). The act of delineating the conventional range of possible
communications involves paying attention to the ‘shibboleths’ of the author’s time; namely,
the prevailing descriptive and normative vocabulary that was available to the author in their
time to describe and legitimise his or her project before the intended audience (Skinner, 1978,
pp. xii–xiii). Such a reconstruction is especially important when the author under consideration
introduces a new representation of phenomenon, as the EOB pioneers did with respect to
bureaucracy. This is because it provides a better appreciation of how pioneering theorists dealt
with the conceptual constraints they faced when making their theoretical innovations at the
margins of their disciplines. Skinner (2002, p. 182) later argued that “rhetorical redescription”
plays an important role in overcoming these constraints. Rhetorical redescription occurs when
a person describes an action or situation with an evaluative term that causes the behaviour or
phenomenon to be viewed in a new perspective. Skinner (2002, p. 184) illustrated this process
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by considering the way virtuous human action is so easily reinterpreted as a vice within the
Aristotelian schema by modifying the terms used to describe the action. For example, heroism
may be transformed into recklessness and tranquillity may be transformed into idleness. In
this thesis I especially draw upon Skinner’s concept of rhetorical redescription to explore how
the EOB pioneers used metaphors and analogies to portray bureaucratic processes in a
dramatically different way. These rhetorical devices in effect imported conventional economic
axioms and concepts, such as ‘self-interest’ and ‘efficiency’, into a subject that previously had
not been described and appraised in economic terms, and thereby justified the application of
economic methods and assumptions to a traditionally non-economic area.
This focus on rhetoric also necessitates drawing upon the works within the research domain of
the rhetoric of economics. Since Deirdre McCloskey’s (1983, 1985) exegetical tour de force
in unveiling the rhetorical nature of the discourses in economics literature, economists and
historians of economics have paid more attention to the rhetorical aspects of the discourse that
shape the evolution of economic thought.9 A salient theme arising from these rhetorical studies
is that the art of economic inquiry and discourse – in particular the metaphors and models by
which economists symbolically represent social reality – powerfully shapes the way
economists interpret and study human action and social phenomena. Paying attention to the
economic rhetoric of the EOB pioneers enriches the analysis of this thesis by showing, firstly,
how the constitutive or explanatory power of metaphors and analogies enabled economists of
this period to comprehend a subject formerly outside their research domain (see Boyd, 1993;
Lewis, 1996), and secondly, how the persuasive power of such devices convinced the intended
audiences that the EOB theories had merit and that EOB is a legitimate field of research within
economics. These two aspects of economic rhetoric are dwelt upon here to counteract the
common misconception that economists’ use of rhetoric is merely decorative or even
manipulative (even though this cannot be entirely ruled out).
In practical terms, the contextualist-cum-rhetorical historiography employed in this thesis
involves (a) reviewing the beliefs concerning bureaucracy that preceded the rise of EOB and
possibly shaped its development, (b) reconstructing the immediate biographical context for
each of the EOB pioneers during the period of the inquiry so as to ‘eavesdrop’ on the emerging
conversation surrounding EOB, (c) expositing the conceptual frameworks developed by each

9

See, for example, Mirowski (1988, 1989), White (1990, 2002), Klamer et al. (1988), Klamer and Leonard (1994),
Coşgel (1996), Lewis (2003), and Morgan (2012).
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EOB pioneer within the context in which it was presented so as to highlight the similarities and
disparities between these frameworks, and (d) examining the methods and rhetoric employed
by the EOB pioneers to develop their analytical visions of bureaucracy and persuade their
audience that their analytical visions had merit. Finally, and this should be stated with emphasis,
the proposed contextualist historiography is not merely an exercise in antiquarianism, since it
is aimed at reconstructing theoretical models and insights, particularly models and insights that
may have been ‘forgotten’, that can bring fresh considerations to economists interested in
studying bureaucracies.10
1.6 Structure of the Thesis
The main purpose of this thesis, to repeat, is to trace the early development of EOB by
highlighting the unique contributions made by each EOB pioneer in three main case studies.
The narrative that results will, hopefully, recover key insights that have possibly been lost in
the passage of time since the early 1970s and, indeed, might even be unknown to those in the
present who preoccupy themselves with EOB as a bona fide field of research in economics.
The chapters are organised as follows.
In chapter 2 I review the way bureaucracy has been depicted in the traditions of classical
political economy, classical public administration, and Austrian economics that preceded the
rise of EOB in the mid-1960s and early 1970s. Scholars in these traditions potentially shaped
the ideas of the EOB pioneers either by anticipating elements of their conceptual frameworks
or by presenting a vision of bureaucracy that is later taken as a point of departure for the EOB
pioneers to advance their own frameworks. I also briefly note one or two developments in
economics that were concurrent to the early development of EOB that potentially influenced
EOB and/or drew upon EOB insights. It is shown that some of the early literature surveyed in
this chapter anticipated one or two elements of EOB, but more often provided the ‘context of
refutation’, or templates to react against, which allowed the EOB pioneers to advance their own
models of bureaucracy.
Chapter 3 is devoted to Tullock’s economic analysis of bureaucracy and constitutes the first of
three ‘case studies’ in which I analyse the conceptual frameworks, models, methods and
rhetoric employed by the EOB pioneers. Tullock’s The Politics of Bureaucracy (1965) is
presented as the effective urtext of EOB. It was arguably the first public choice foray against
10

See Peacock (1992, pp. 17–20, 2010, p. 10) and Brennan et al. (2014).

13

Chapter 1: Introduction
the quasi-normative, if not idealistic, visions of bureaucracy that then dominated the social
sciences. It also contained the first systematic representation of the bureaucrat as a selfinterested rational agent and arguably presented the first hierarchical-distortion model of
bureaucracy. There is also evidence that this seminal work strongly influenced the other EOB
pioneers by prompting them to develop their own economic accounts of bureaucracy.
In chapter 4 I turn to the economic analysis of bureaucracy that Downs advanced in a cut-down
form in a RAND monograph in 1964 and in a fully developed form in Inside Bureaucracy in
1967. Downs extended Tullock’s EOB vision by explicitly postulating the possibility of
motivational diversity among self-interested bureaucrats and a dynamic selection mechanism
that favour bureaucrats pursuing different sets of objectives at various stages of a bureaucracy’s
life cycle. Downs’ notion of motivational diversity supplied him with the intellectual resources
for a richer institutional analysis of bureaucracy, even though Downs himself did not fully
exploit these resources to enrich his own version of a hierarchical-distortion model.
In chapter 5 I consider the economic analysis of bureaucracy developed by Niskanen in a range
of publications, including Bureaucracy and Representative Government (1971). Niskanen’s
analysis is presented as a fundamental shift in the early history of EOB. Although he borrowed
key insights from Tullock and Downs, such as the self-interested bureaucrat, he shifted
attention away from the problem of hierarchical coordination within bureaucracies that
preoccupied these two authors. Specifically, he shifted the focus of the nascent EOB field from
the internal principal-agent problem that drives hierarchical distortion within the bureaucracy
to an external principal-agent problem in which bureaucrats opportunistically exploit situations
of information asymmetry to induce external sponsors to provide budgets that are larger than
optimal. This entailed Niskanen drawing upon his Chicago training in marginalist and
equilibrium economics to determine the extent to which non-market bureaucratic production
outcomes are inefficient relative to market production outcomes.
Finally, in chapter 6 I provide a stocktake of the key contributions, economic rhetoric, and the
neglected insights in the early works of EOB. This entails a more detailed review of the
contentions presented in section 1.3 of this introduction, and hence need not be repeated here.
The thesis concludes with the central claim that the overwhelming success of Niskanen’s
budget-maximising model established EOB as a legitimate research field in economics, but
that several insights in Tullock’s and Downs’ works were lost as a result and the recovery of
such insights could enrich our understanding of bureaucracies today.
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2.1 Introduction
The objective in this chapter is to review the early theories of bureaucracy that possibly shaped
the EOB vision in its golden age. It therefore does not constitute a full review of the voluminous
literature devoted to the topic of bureaucracy. A multi-disciplinary exercise of this kind would
amount to a stand-alone doctoral thesis, and, in any event, systematic surveys of this nature
have already been attempted in a slew of scholarly texts. Some of these systematic surveys are
now admittedly a little dated and they often under-emphasise the importance of EOB, but, as
mentioned in chapter one, they are worthy for all this and provide valuable context for the
limited objective of this chapter (see especially Albrow, 1970; Jackson, 1982). It is also
proposed that the theories of bureaucracy which are reasonable candidates for shaping the EOB
vision emerged within three main intellectual traditions: classical political economy, classical
public administration, and Austrian economics. Scholars working within these traditions
potentially influenced the EOB pioneers either by anticipating a theme of the EOB vision or,
more usually, by depicting bureaucracy in a way that EOB pioneers reacted against. Finally, it
should be emphasised that some traditions which influenced leading public choice figures are
not explored if it is implausible that they influenced the EOB pioneers specifically. Thus,
although the Italian public finance tradition influenced Buchanan (Buchanan, 1960; Medema,
2005), and Adolf Wagner and the German historical economists influenced Peacock (Peacock
and Wiseman, 1961), there is no evidence that the EOB pioneers were even aware of these
movements, and hence they do not feature in the narrative that follows.
This review chapter contains four main sections. In section 2.2 the rudimentary theories
relating to bureaucracy developed within the classical school of political economy in the late
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries are considered, with a particular focus on the writings
of Adam Smith and John Stuart Mill. In section 2.3 the more developed theories of bureaucracy
presented within classical public administration in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries are analysed, with a particular focus on the writings of Woodrow Wilson and Max
Weber. In section 2.4 the critiques of bureaucracy expounded within the Austrian school of
economics during the socialist calculation debate in the twentieth century are reviewed, with a
particular focus on the writings of Ludwig von Mises, Friedrich Hayek and Joseph Schumpeter.
Finally, in section 2.5 the near contemporaries of the EOB pioneers who considered the nature
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of bureaucracy are briefly reviewed before a conclusion is presented.
2.2 Bureaucracy Theory in Classical Political Economy: Smith and Mill
Adam Smith did not develop a fully-fledged theory of bureaucratic behaviour. He nonetheless
developed various insights concerning political and bureaucratic institutions that were later
formalised within the public choice tradition from the 1960s onwards. Ricketts (1978), for
instance, has highlighted Smith’s comprehension of government failure due to knowledge,
political incentive, and rent-seeking problems, even though Smith himself did not use such
language (see also Stigler, 1971b; Stimson & Milgate, 2008; West, 1976). Smith (1776/1981,
p. 687) used these and other insights to oppose the highly politicised mercantilist economy,
which was symptomatic of the age of ‘Old Corruption’ in eighteenth-century Britain, and to
advocate for a market economy organised in accordance with “natural liberty”.1 His arguments
in favour of a market economy were, moreover, underpinned by a comparative institutional
claim rather than an absolute claim. This is often overlooked by modern economists. That is,
Smith was engaged in comparing alternative institutional arrangements, particularly the
alternative sets of constraints and incentives they impose on individuals, to determine the
relative success of public and private institutions in harnessing the self-interest of individuals
to advance the well-being of society (Aligică et al., 2019; Buchanan, 1989; West, 1976).
Smith’s (1776/1981, p. 641) twin formulation of human motivation and the different
institutional context “in which [individuals] are placed” also involved a more complex
characterisation of human motivation than is commonly recognised. This included presuming
that individuals pursue more objectives than just “wealth maximisation through time” (Peacock,
1992, p. 69).2 This, in turn, enabled Smith to envisage self-interested individuals switching
from pursuing one objective (say, wealth) to another (say, status or ease) in different
institutional contexts, which in some instances means that individual interests remain
unreconciled and what are now called principal-agent problems arise. Such attention to
institutional arrangements became rare in mainstream economics following the marginalist or
neoclassical revolution in the 1870s (Rosenberg, 1960) but resurfaced when the EOB pioneers
modelled the behaviour of agents in non-market and hierarchical environments.

1

‘Old Corruption’, a term coined in the 1830s, referred to the systematic corruption and political cronyism in
Britain’s public institutions which eventually prompted intense pressure to sanitise the government of its
sinecurism and favouritism. See Rubinstein (1983), Harling (1995), and Hill (2006).
2

For an examination of the elaborate conception of human nature by Smith and the classical economists see
Rosenberg (1960), Peacock (1992), and Morgan (2006, 2012).
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Smith’s method of comparative institutional analysis is neatly illustrated by several case studies
in Book V of The Wealth of Nations. His critique of the remuneration of university teachers
via endowments, for instance, demonstrates the principal-agent problem in public institutions
that are insulated from market pressures. Comparing the remuneration schemes in universities
across Britain, Smith (1776/1981, pp. 760–761) noted that fully salaried professors who were
“prohibited from receiving any honorary or fee from [their] pupils” generally pursued ease and
leisure over providing quality teaching, a tendency best exemplified in the way the idle Oxford
dons of his era had “given up altogether even the pretence of teaching”. English independent
schools, on the other hand, were not plagued by sinecurism to the same extent in Smith’s
(1776/1981, p. 765) view because the “reward of the schoolmaster in most cases depends
principally… upon the fees or honoraries of his scholars”. 3 Smith recognised a similar
principal-agent problem in the newfangled corporations of his time, especially those that had
been established with the state’s assistance, such as the East India Company, which had been
granted exclusive privileges by law (Anderson & Tollison, 1982; Donoghue, 2020; Spengler,
1975, pp. 409–410). Smith (1776/1981, p. 737) noted that the lack of competitive pressure
associated with such privileges combined with a division of ownership and managerial control
meant that the directors of such corporations exhibited “no particular interest in the prosperity
of the general trade of the company” and hence failed to promote efficiency within their
companies. From these and several other examples given in The Wealth of Nations, Smith
(1776/1981, p. 719) concluded that “[p]ublic services are never better performed than when
their reward comes only in consequence of their being performed, and is proportioned to the
diligence employed in performing them”. Thus, in the absence of institutional features to
coordinate conflicting self-interests, Smith hypothesised what the EOB pioneers would later
affirm: that bureaucrats pursue their own objectives at the expense of the public interest. There
are, for all this, few specific references to Smith in the EOB narratives, and hence crossfertilisation between these two visions is likely to be indirect.
The classical political economists of the early nineteenth century, such as David Ricardo,
James Mill, and John Stuart Mill, followed Smith in privileging the market economy over the
state-run economy. John Stuart Mill is here selected from these economists for special
comment because he synthesised the different strands of the classical framework (Mill,
1848/1909) and, perhaps more importantly, because he provided a succinct theory of
3

For a more extensive discussion on the economics of education in Adam Smith and the classical economists see
Blaug (1975).
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bureaucracy in seminal works, such as On Liberty (1859/1977) and Considerations on
Representative Government (1861/1977). Mill was educated by his father James Mill and
family friend Jeremy Bentham, both of whom were part of the Philosophical Radical and
Utilitarian movements that sought political reforms to reduce the power and privileges that the
Aristocrats derived from the ‘Old Corruption’.4 Mill (1861/1977, pp. 390, 392) developed the
Utilitarian philosophy to a more sophisticated pitch as he grew older and, ultimately, set forth
two criteria for good government: “the degree in which it tends to increase the sum of good
qualities in the governed, collectively and individually”, and “the degree of perfection with
which they organize the moral, intellectual, and active worth already existing, so as to operate
with the greatest effect on public affairs”. According to Mill, this meant good government
combines civic participation and competence by cultivating intelligence and virtue among the
citizenry so that good works can be performed for them and by means of them (Warner, 2001).
He therefore favoured a system of representative government in which citizens are called on to
render “personal discharge of some public function, local or general” (Mill, 1861/1977, p. 404)
and to select the most competent among them to perform the higher duties of government. It
was in this context that Mill contended an elite civil service which recruits and promotes staff
on merit (i.e., a professional bureaucracy) could provide the specialised knowledge required to
implement the policies proposed by elected representatives.
Mill, indeed, believed that a professional British civil service was both compatible with and
beneficial to democracy. He declared that the “essence and meaning of bureaucracy” is the
placement of government affairs “in the hands of governors by profession” (Mill, 1861/1977,
p. 438). The establishment of such an elite body is highly desirable because it “accumulates
experience, acquires well-tried and well-considered traditional maxims, and makes provision
for appropriate practical knowledge in those who have the actual conduct of affairs” (Mill,
1861/1977, p. 439). Mill nonetheless recognised that governments dominated by bureaucracies
could also die of rigid routine and the type of “trained mediocrity” which turns even the most
talented and creative civil servants into mere cogs in the administrative machine. Moreover,
Mill (1859/1977, p. 307) warned of the danger of a growing bureaucracy monopolising all the
distinguished talents of the nation and thereby stifling the public’s ability to criticise or reform
the activities of the bureaucratic public administration to keep it vigorous. He also feared for

4
On Mill’s biography and intellectual formation see Ryan (1989) and Alexander Brady’s introduction to Essays
on Politics and Society (Brady, 1977). For an account of the overlapping Philosophical Radical, Utilitarian, and
Classical Political Economy movements see Leslie Stephen’s The English Utilitarians (1900/2011).
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the political freedoms of citizens if they became exclusively dependent on a dominant
bureaucracy for direction and warned of how the able and ambitious could exploit it for their
personal advancement. Mill (1859/1977, p. 308) therefore concluded that it is in the interest of
liberty and good public governance to ensure that a countervailing force of intelligent and alert
citizens exists outside the bureaucracy to keep it under constant “watchful criticism”.
Mill, in short, had a more sanguine vision of bureaucracy than Smith and many of the classical
political economists. The divergence between Smith and Mill’s conception of bureaucracy
partly lies in the differences of the analytical questions they posed to themselves. Smith
predominantly focused on comparing the incentive structures of various institutions to
determine the degree to which they harmonised individual self-interest for the collective good
and concluded in favour of a market economy with a limited government chiefly (but not only)
devoted to protecting property rights and enforcing private contracts. Mill largely shared
Smith’s vision (even if he developed some socialist tendencies later in life), but also sought to
provide a theory of how government and public administration could promote individual liberty
and human flourishing. Mill therefore preoccupied himself with the design of democratic
institutions that maximise civic participation and select the most able individuals to assist in
the administration of governmental affairs. He recognised the danger that an unfettered
bureaucracy could undermine a liberal society but had faith that the right balance could be
achieved. The waning of the ‘Old Corruption’ in the nineteenth century, the British Civil
Service reforms of in the 1850s, and Mill’s own noble service as a bureaucrat in the East India
Company no doubt further induced him to believe that a merit-based professional bureaucracy
was possible. The EOB theorists were aware of Mill’s arguments in favour of bureaucracy if
only because it became the received view of the role of bureaucracy within a liberal democracy.
Mill’s qualifications and warnings were, however, often forgotten, especially as they were
quickly overshadowed by a radical optimism amongst public administration theorists about the
capabilities of bureaucracy. It is to these accounts that I now turn.
2.3 Classical Public Administration Theory of Bureaucracy: Wilson and Weber
Woodrow Wilson’s ‘The Study of Administration’ (1887) and Max Weber’s famous treatment
of bureaucracy in Economy and Society (1922/2019) are often regarded as central texts of early
public administration. They are reviewed in brief here, however, less because of their
foundational status in the discipline of public administration and more because of two related
reasons. First, they represent nicely the completion of the shift in the general intellectual mood
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that, as already mentioned, was first tentatively articulated by Mill. Specifically, these
publications signal the shift in sentiment from the pessimistic accounts of government
bureaucracy by classical political economists in the first half of the nineteenth century to the
optimistic views of the capabilities of government machinery in the New Liberal or Progressive
era of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. This shift in sentiment entailed
representing the bureaucratic public administration as a centralised, hierarchical organisation
of professionally trained public officials who dispassionately and efficiently administers public
policy for the common good. Second, these two narratives are important for the larger narrative
arc of this thesis because, as will be shown in the chapters that follow, the EOB pioneers took
Weber’s definition of bureaucracy as the received definition to be adjusted for their own ends
and, further, they treated Weber and Wilson as the authorities of an orthodoxy they wished to
reject. In relation to the latter point, they argued that the secondary literature devoted to
bureaucracy was essentially a “normative mishmash of Max Weber’s sociology and Woodrow
Wilson’s vision of public administration” (Niskanen, 2012, p. 97; see also Shughart & Tollison,
2016, p. 238). The writings of Wilson and Weber are therefore reviewed here to ensure that the
EOB chapters which follow are comprehended with ease.5
The beginning of the study of public administration is often traced to Wilson’s famous 1887
essay, ‘The Study of Administration’. Wilson was writing in the Progressive era in the United
States, when radical reforms were proposed to ensure that the spoils system in government was
replaced with a professional civil service capable of managing the challenges of rapid
industrialisation and urbanisation (Fry & Raadschelders, 2014, p. 23).6 Wilson (1887, p. 209)
echoed the general Progressive sentiment that public administration should be “removed from
the hurry and strife of politics” and be based on technical principles that ensured the efficient
execution of public policy. He therefore promoted the idea of a science of administration and
hence launched a systematic study of general principles that would perfect the government
machinery. He envisioned a bureaucratic structure overseen by a corps of public officials

5

As will be shown further below in this section, the EOB representations of the public administration literature
are unfortunately more difficult to weigh in the balance than usual because they are based on now contested
readings of the original texts, especially in the case of Weber. It is also certainly not claimed that this section
presents a comprehensive review of twentieth century public administration literature. For an excellent survey of
this literature, see Fry and Raadschelders’ Mastering Public Administration (2014; see also Ostrom, 1974).
6
In Wilson’s (1887, p. 201) words, “The poisonous atmosphere of city government, the crooked secrets of state
administration, the confusion, sinecurism, and corruption ever and again discovered in the bureaux at Washington
forbid us to believe that any clear conceptions of what constitutes good administration are as yet very widely
current in the United States”.
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“prepared by a special schooling and drilled, after appointment, into a perfected organization,
with appropriate hierarchy and characteristic discipline” (Wilson, 1887, p. 216). These
professionally qualified officials would be trained to dispatch public policy for the common
good in a ‘businesslike’ and non-partisan manner. They would also be entrusted with great
power and discretion because, Wilson (1887, pp. 213–14) argued, the centralisation of power
ensures that the public can identify when officials abuse their power and discretion and, further,
the higher esteem in which official are held discourages opportunistic behaviour. In fact,
Wilson contended that the decentralisation of power, though vital to a liberal democracy at the
constitutional and legislative level, leads to great confusion and corruption at the level of public
administration. As noted by Vincent Ostrom (1974, p. 27), Wilson apparently “could conceive
a theory of democratic government but not a theory of democratic administration”. Wilson, in
short, sought to replace the spoils system with a bureaucratic model of public administration
that is scientific, meritocratic, non-partisan, and efficient.
Weber’s conception of bureaucracy in Economy and Society reinforced Wilson’s vision of a
professional and hierarchical bureaucracy as a subject of study in the field of public
administration. Indeed, although Weber was a prolific scholar whose interests and intellectual
reach go way beyond the field of public administration, his ideas relating to bureaucracy made
a particularly lasting impact in this field. Unfortunately, however, the various interpretations
and translations of Weber’s writings presented in the field of public administration (and later
public finance and economics more generally) are now contested by Weberian scholars. They
especially question Talcott Parsons’ imperfect translation (with A. M. Henderson) of Weber’s
Economy and Society (see Byrkjeflot, 2018; Cohen et al., 1975; Tribe, 2007). The EOB
pioneers themselves relied on two English translations of Weber’s text: From Max Weber:
Essays in Sociology (Weber, 1946/2009) by Hans Gerth and C. Wright Mills and the one by
Henderson and Parsons (Weber, 1947). It is therefore possible that the EOB pioneers
compounded a misrepresentation of Weber by providing flawed readings of a Weberian text in
the process of criticising an equally flawed reading offered by the public administration
theorists. These common

mis-readings included the contentions that Weber believed

bureaucracies are always desirable (perhaps by mis-interpreting the nature of a Weberian ideal
type) or ought to be efficient (leading to the earlier mentioned refrain that Weber’s frame was
normative in nature).7 It is, however, beyond the scope of this thesis to discuss the posthumous
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See, for example, Anthony Downs’ reading of Weber in section 4.3.
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history and translation of Weber’s text, and hence the EOB pioneers’ interpretation and usage
of Weber’s text is taken as given in the chapters that follow. A modest attempt of a faithful
summary of Weber’s notion of bureaucracy will nonetheless be provided here.8
A prominent theme in Weber’s scholarly work is the rationalisation of modern civilisation. He
famously identified three ideal or ‘pure’ types of legitimate rule in society based on charisma,
tradition, and legal rationality (Weber, 1922/2019, pp. 341–343).9 The rational-legal form in
particular entails organising human activity according to impersonal rules and universal
principles derived from rational reasoning (see Collins, 1986, pp. 61–79; Kalberg, 1980).
Weber contended that bureaucracy is the salient manifestation of the legal, economic, and
technical rationality in the modern world. He distilled the essence of this modern form of
organisation into an ideal type which possesses the following characteristics (Weber,
1922/2019, pp. 343–348). The organisation is based on a legal order that is stipulated in written
documents. It is divided into offices that are arranged hierarchically to allow a clear division
of labour under a monocratic centre of authority. The officials themselves are appointed to their
administrative posts based on their competencies and specialised qualifications rather than
personal ties and prestige or via a democratic vote (i.e., it is a meritocracy rather than an
aristocracy or democracy). The officials are full-time salaried employees who cannot
personally appropriate their positions or the organisation’s resources. They are subject to a
unified system of control and supervision and hence relate to each other on an impersonal and
hierarchical basis as subordinates and superiors. In short, Weber’s ideal type of bureaucracy is
a form of technical administration in which everything is done according to the rules, everyone
has an appointed position according to their skills and competency, and there is a centralised
chain of command.
Weber further contended that the bureaucratic structure is, in principle, applicable to every area
of society, and added that profit-making enterprises, charitable organisations, and government
institutions are all increasingly bureaucratised over time (Weber, 1922/2019, p. 350). He
believed that bureaucratisation is inevitable because bureaucracy is technically superior to
8
The summary is based on two translations of Weber’s writings on bureaucracy: Keith Tribe’s recent translation
of Economy and Society (Weber, 1922/2019) and Gerth and Mills’ 1946 translation of selective works by Weber
(Weber, 1946/2009). For the posthumous history of Economy and Society see Hanke (2009) and Tribe (2015).
9
Weber’s ideal type is best understood as an abstract construct relating to the behaviour of agents and the
outcomes of this behaviour (such as the concepts of homo economicus, democracy, bureaucracy etc.) that allows
the different concrete episodes involving such behaviour to be compared. See Weber (1949, pp. 90–92), Machlup
(1978, Chapters 8 and 9), and Morgan (2012, Chapter 4).
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other forms of organisation. In his words: “Precision, speed, unambiguity, knowledge of the
files, continuity, discretion, unity, strict subordination, reduction of friction and of material and
personal costs – these are raised to the optimum point in the strictly bureaucratic administration,
and especially in its monocratic form” (Weber, 1946/2009, p. 214). At no time did Weber
examine the degree to which bureaucratic organisations could be inefficient in the way
proposed by the EOB pioneers (Albrow, 1970, p. 46). He also did not frame the degree of
efficiency or inefficiency of bureaucratic organisations as a hypothesis to be tested.10 Like Mill,
however, Weber emphasised the negative consequences of the bureaucratisation of society.
There is, for example, a tendency for bureaucracy to transform its members into bureaucratic
personalities who completely subordinate themselves to a perfected bureaucratic machine:
“The individual bureaucrat cannot squirm out of the apparatus in which he is harnessed… the
professional bureaucrat is chained to his activity by his entire material and ideal existence. In
the great majority of cases, he is only a single cog in an ever-moving mechanism which
prescribes to him an essentially fixed route of march” (Weber, 1946/2009, p. 228).
The propositions advanced by Wilson and Weber reviewed in this section were integrated into
the field of public administration and, by the mid-twentieth century, arguably gave rise to a
shallow optimism regarding the capabilities of bureaucracy (see Ostrom, 1974, Chapter 2).
This optimism carried over to the fields of public finance and welfare economics to such a
degree that many practitioners in these areas felt it acceptable in their model building to assume
that public officials are competent, efficient, and impartial (Thompson, 2008). Practitioners in
these fields certainly did not model bureaucrats overseeing the rapidly rising welfare state of
this time as self-interested agents, even though, admittedly, a limited number did accompany
their policy advice with the warning that bureaucrats may act in a self-interested fashion.11 This
explains why the EOB pioneers often presented Wilson and Weber as articulating a vision that
they proposed to reject. They also often took Weber’s widely cited definition of bureaucracy
as the starting point of their analysis because it was the received definition in most disciplines
and, as we will see in in chapter four of this thesis, on one or two occasions because they sought

10
Weber’s ideal type of bureaucracy is often portrayed as containing hypotheses for organisational efficiency
which are tested via empirical studies (Gajduschek, 2003; Weiss, 1983). But this is to misunderstand Weber’s
notion of ideal type (see footnote 9). As Byrkjeflot (2018) and others have shown, Weber’s bureaucracy ideal type
is primarily a definitional construct, rather than a normative guide for organisational design.
11
It is noteworthy that even the main representatives of early welfare economics, such as Henry Sidgwick, Alfred
Marshall, and A. C. Pigou, were aware of the incentive and knowledge problems in government and did not
naively believe that market failures automatically warrant government intervention (see Backhouse & Medema,
2012).
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to demonstrate that some of Weber’s defining characteristics of a bureaucracy are not
necessarily present once bureaucrats are presumed to pursue their own interests. It is also
interesting as an end note (if not a little paradoxical) that Tullock drew upon Weber’s
hermeneutical method of understanding (Verstehen) to explore the failings of bureaucracy.
This last point is developed further in chapter three of this thesis.
2.4 The Austrian Critique of Bureaucracy in the Socialist Calculation Debate: Mises,
Hayek and Schumpeter
The third cast of characters that is relevant to the development of EOB includes the Austrian
economists, particularly Ludwig von Mises, Friedrich Hayek, and Joseph Schumpeter. This
should not be surprising given that there are broad areas of agreement between Austrian
economics and public choice theory (of which EOB was obviously a part). Both groups of
economists embraced methodological individualism and a rational choice explanation of social
phenomena rather than the holistic accounts that were then often employed in the social
sciences (Boettke & López, 2002; Boettke & Leeson, 2004).12 Economists from the respective
groups also proffered various theories of ‘government failure’ that cast doubt on the state’s
capacity to solve perceived socio-economic problems. Indeed, the rapid growth of the welfare
state during the twentieth century especially induced a “sense of kinship” between the Austrian
and public choice theorists in their efforts to constrain the Leviathan (Ikeda, 2003, p. 63). There
is, for all this, limited cross-fertilisation between the Austrian and public choice traditions.
There are at least two reasons for this. First, the two groups of economists diverged in their
analytical approach to studying the government. The public choice theorists were not averse to
applying the static, equilibrium, and utility-maximisation models of neoclassical economics to
the political domain, whereas the Austrians analysed markets and politics as dynamic processes
in which purposeful agents faced with constant change and radical uncertainty exploit the gains
present in disequilibrium states (Kirzner, 1997; Ikeda, 2003). Second, the Austrians and public
choice theorists focused on different sources of government failure. The public choice theorists
invariably traced government failure back to the narrow self-interest of political agents,
whereas the Austrians, due to their engagement in the socialist calculation debate (Vaughn,
1980; Caldwell, 1997), tended to attribute government failure to the inability of central
planners to replicate the knowledge conveyed via the market price system. The Austrians
nonetheless anticipated several public choice themes broadly and EOB insights specifically in
12

Holcombe (2015, p. 492) argued, however, that this is a trivial similarity between the two traditions given that
methodological individualism is “common throughout economics and not unique to the Austrian school”.
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their analyses of bureaucracies. Consider, in turn, Mises, Hayek and Schumpeter in relation to
these themes.
Mises’ Bureaucracy (1944) may be considered the first explicit and systematic economic
treatment of bureaucracy before the advent of public choice. The book can be seen as an
extension of his earlier contributions to the socialist calculation debate (Mises, 1920/2012,
1922/1951; Peacock, 2007) by investigating “the peculiar characteristics of bureaucratic
management as distinguished from commercial management” (Mises, 1944, p. 45). Unlike
Wilson and Weber who maintained that commercial and public administration are one and the
same, Mises claimed that they entailed fundamentally different managerial methods.
Commercial management emerged out of modern accounting practices that enable resources
to be allocated to competing ends according to market prices and the profit motive. This makes
the “public supreme” because profit (or loss) signals to a firm that it is producing something
more valuable (or less valuable) to consumers than the resources it is using (Mises, 1944, p.
88). Furthermore, the contribution of each managerial division within a firm can be measured
by the common metric of monetary profit, such that managers at every level of the firm are
induced to serve the changing needs of the consumer. By contrast, public administration (or
government bureaucracy) is a “management of affairs which cannot be checked by economic
calculation” (Mises, 1944, p. 48) because public services are neither priced nor exchanged in
the market. As a result, public bureaus rely on hierarchical rules and the discretion of
bureaucrats to allocate resources, and hence they are likely to reflect the preferences of the
bureaucrats rather than the wider community. Mises also believed that the management of
private enterprises can become bureaucratised because of state intervention. 13 Specifically,
state intervention distorts market prices and curtails the profit motive for firms to innovate and
produce what consumers value. The labour market is thereby also distorted as personnel are
hired based on the non-monetary utility of public bureaucrats and the employee’s ability to
“smooth away difficulties with the [government] authorities” (Mises, 1944, p. 70). 14

13

Mises did not dismiss all forms of government intervention, arguing that beneficial intervention, such as the
protection of property rights and enforcement of contracts, facilitates social cooperation and voluntary exchange
(see Carnis, 2009, pp. 64–65). He nonetheless believed “the value of good government” is “not liable to an
expression in figures” to the same extent as goods valued in market prices (Mises, 1944, p. 48).
14

Mises therefore implicitly contested Weber’s notion of bureaucratic relationships as strictly formal and
impersonal. Whereas market relationships are predicated on impersonal judgements concerning market prices and
goods being exchanged, the superior-subordinate relationships in bureaucratic organisations depend on the
superior’s personal and arbitrary “judgement of his [subordinate’s] personality, not of his work” (Mises, 1944, p.
53).
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Bureaucratic order thereby transforms “social relationships from contractual bonds to
hegemonic ones” (Carnis, 2009, p. 62). As briefly mentioned in the introductory comments of
chapter one, and as will be shown at length in the chapters that follow, the EOB pioneers also
emphasised the implications of the non-market feature of government bureaucracy.
Mises’ warnings relating to the dangers of bureaucratic planning are echoed by Hayek in The
Road to Serfdom (1944/2007), which was published in the same year as Bureaucracy. This
book was written in response to the growing sympathy toward socialism in Britain at the time.
Hayek particularly sought to dismantle a widely held view that the rise of fascist regimes in
Germany and elsewhere was “a natural outgrowth of capitalism, and that only by adopting
socialism could the remaining western democracies avoid a similar fate” (Caldwell, 1997, p.
1867). To the contrary, Hayek argued that socialist planning, far from constraining
totalitarianism, engenders a path toward a totalitarian regime. Alan Peacock, in his book Public
Choice Analysis in Historical Perspective (1992, pp. 59–60), deemed Hayek’s thesis to be nonpublic choice because it entails an “ideas-driven” account of politics while neglecting the key
public choice insight that individuals are driven by private incentives and not purely by ideas
in the political realm. Specifically, he accused Hayek of assuming that democratic governments
turn into authoritarian states as people are passively ‘captured’ by socialist ideas and policy
proposals. Peacock, however, misunderstood the purpose and thesis of Hayek’s book. As
Boettke (1995, p. 8) pointed out, Hayek’s central argument is not that socialist ideas directly
lead to totalitarianism, but that the new demands placed on democratic institutions from even
a partial implementation of socialist ideas or policies induce endogenous changes in the
preferences of public officials who then gradually transform democratic institutions “into
instruments of totalitarian rule”. This is because government officials seek to expand the scope
of their planning over time once their initial intervention in the market inevitably fails due to
the economic calculation problem. This then generates an adverse selection process that
favours government officials who have a comparative advantage in “ruthless” and
“unscrupulous” behaviour, since “the readiness to do bad things becomes a path to promotion
and power” (Hayek, 1944/2007, p. 169; see also Boettke, 1995, p. 12). As will be shown in the
next chapter, Tullock adopted a similar adverse selection process for bureaucratic organisations,
but without citing Hayek. Indeed, Hayek’s name is rarely mentioned in the EOB literature,
even though this insight is of some importance.
Schumpeter presented another relevant, though idiosyncratic, Austrian analysis of bureaucracy
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in Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (1942/2014). 15 Schumpeter famously argued that
(non-Marxist) internal contradictions in capitalism eventually give rise to socialism and,
controversially, that socialist planning was possible precisely through a perfected bureaucratic
administration. Specifically, Schumpeter (1934/1949, p. 66) portrayed economic development
as carrying out “new combinations” by employing resources in different ways or producing
new things. Entrepreneurs are the drivers of this development in a capitalist society since they
“revolutionize the pattern of production” by introducing new production methods or products
(Schumpeter, 1942/2014, p. 132). Schumpeter believed, however, that the very success of this
capitalist process generates several forces that undermine it, with the bureaucratisation of
economic life being one such force.16 He argued that large corporations in capitalist societies
establish bureaucratic structures both to exploit economies of scale and to reduce innovation
to mechanical routine by establishing teams of specialists to deliver technological innovation
in a predictable fashion. The entrepreneur is thereby rendered obsolete and the socialist state,
which cannot operate without a “huge and all-embracing bureaucratic apparatus”, has a readymade bureaucratic structure to inherit (Schumpeter, 1942/2014, p. 206; see also Thompson,
2008, p. 356). He further contended that this development would not be the catastrophe
predicted by his Austrian colleagues because there is “nothing wrong with the pure logic of
socialism” (Schumpeter, 1942/2014, p. 172). That is, he conceded the points raised by Barone,
Lange, and other opponents of the Austrians in the calculation debate that a planning bureau
can devise systems to allocate resources efficiently and, further, can remove the uncertainties
and alleged wasteful duplication inherent in capitalism (Schumpeter, 1942/2014, pp. 172–173,
185–186). He added that “social recognition and prestige” could also be employed to motivate
bureaucrats to dutifully discharge their service according to the public interest (Schumpeter,
1942/2014, p. 207).17 Overall, Schumpeter’s sanguine vision of a socialist society underpinned
by an efficient bureaucratic apparatus resonates with the bureaucratic ideal advanced by Wilson
and Weber. It was, however, not cited by the EOB pioneers either as something to attack or
15
Schumpeter, of course, does not sit squarely in the Austrian tradition even though he shared the same Vienna
milieu with Mises and Hayek. He diverged over time from this tradition and developed his own theories that led
to different conclusions. For the relationship between Schumpeter and Austrian economics see Kisch (1979),
Simpson (1983), Boehm (1990), März (1991), and Vanberg (2015). His credentials as a public choice precursor
more generally have been explored by Mitchell (1984a, 1984b).
16

For Schumpeter’s account of this transition to socialism see also Blokland (2006), Swedberg and Schumpeter
(1992), and Swedberg (2002).
17
In a rather puzzling episode, Schumpeter (1946) wrote a favourable review of The Road to Serfdom, in which
he complimented Hayek for his perceptive analysis of the limitations of bureaucracies and the way bureaucratic
planning may give rise to tyranny. He nonetheless maintained his belief in the viability of socialism and that
bureaucracy would be vital to its efficient allocation of resources.
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draw upon.
This brief survey demonstrates that the Austrians anticipated one or two insights later
emphasised by the EOB pioneers in the public choice tradition, even if the former were rarely
cited by the latter. Each of the EOB pioneers, for example, emphasised the negative
consequences of rule-bound and hierarchical bureaucracies that did not sell a product or service
in the market (as dwelt on by Mises), while Tullock and Downs emphasised the way selection
processes in such organisations generate perverse bureaucratic actors (as suggested by Hayek).
Ultimately, however, the goals of the Austrian and public choice economists diverged
sufficiently that cross-fertilisation (and cross-citations) between the two sets of scholars was
limited. Even though the Austrians and the public choice economists (and EOB economists
more specifically) both criticised the romantic conception of the state by questioning “the twin
assumptions of benevolence and omniscience on the part of political economy decisionmakers”, the Austrians primarily challenged the “omniscience” assumption within the socialist
calculation debate while the public choice economists (and EOB economists more specifically)
primarily questioned the “benevolence” assumption by arguing that political actors are driven
by their self-interest (Boettke & López, 2002, p. 112). 18 The divergence between these
economists on matters of method was equally problematic, and, as we will see, even more
vexingly complex. The Austrians tended to adopt process-driven and non-mathematical
accounts of government bureaucracy that turned on knowledge failures, selection mechanisms,
and endogenous preferences, while the public choice economists employed neoclassical
equilibrium modelling and mathematical formalism when it served their needs. Indeed, given
the hegemony of neoclassical economics in the second half of the twentieth century, one
contention of this thesis is that the EOB economists potentially reduced the persuasiveness of
their narratives by the extent to which they adopted Austrian-style methods (even when not
citing them). It will later be shown that the non-mathematical and process-driven models of
bureaucracy advanced by Tullock and Downs were overshadowed by the Chicago-style
equilibrium model of bureaucracy proposed by Niskanen, with the latter becoming the standard
model immediately after the publication of his seminal book in 1971.

18
The tendency to relax one of the twin assumptions with regards to political agents but not the other presents a
methodological tension between the two traditions, though not an irreconcilable one, as evidenced by recent
scholarly attempts to combine Austrian and public choice insights (e.g., Aligică et al., 2019; Buchanan & Vanberg,
2002; Foldvary, 2002; Holcombe, 2002).
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2.5 Some Near-Contemporaries to EOB and Conclusion
As a postscript, and before proceeding to the conclusion, it should be acknowledged that the
EOB pioneers were also likely influenced by two near-contemporary developments in
economics. Both these developments entailed using economic reasoning in a domain
traditionally occupied by administrative and organisational theory. The first of these was the
decision-making school led by Herbert Simon at the Carnegie Institute of Technology (and
hence sometimes called the Carnegie School) in the 1950s and early 1960s. Simon (1947, 1955)
sought to apply economic techniques and empiricist methods to model individual decisionmaking within organisations. He contended that the traditional concept of homo economicus is
flawed because people are rationally bounded in the sense that they have limited time and
mental capacity to determine the choices available to them and the consequences of each
alternative. Individuals therefore rely on heuristics or ‘rules of thumb’ and seek to satisfice
rather than maximise outcomes. Simon’s colleagues at Carnegie, Richard Cyert and James
March (1963), subsequently drew upon his analytical vision to develop what came to be known
as the ‘behavioural theory’ of the firm, which entailed modelling the agents within the firm as
pursing conflicting goals with imperfect information rather than collectively maximising
profits with perfect information. The second near-contemporary development was constituted
by an array of economists who contributed to the new ‘managerial theories’ of the firm in the
late 1950s and early 1960s. This entailed modelling corporate managers as agents who exploit
the division between ownership and control to pursue objectives other than profit-maximisation.
William Baumol (1959) proposed sales revenue maximisation, Oliver Williamson (1967a)
considered a range of managerial objectives (salary, perquisites, leisure, staff expenditure etc.)
and, Robin Marris (1964) focused on growth maximisation (see also Alchian, 1965; Machlup,
1967).19
Overall, these two developments exemplified the way economists from the 1950s onwards
sought to analyse the incentive and information problems that induce managers to pursue
objectives other than the stated objective of the firm (i.e., to maximise profits). Given that the
EOB pioneers sought to model individuals along similar lines in non-market and hierarchical
organisations, it is not surprising that they cited the publications from these near-contemporary

19
Although Williamson himself was trained within the Carnegie tradition and there is some overlap between the
frameworks used by Carnegie and within the New Theory of the Firm, these two movements were quite different,
if only because those who contributed to the theory of the firm were more likely to use equilibrium techniques to
model managerial behaviour.
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traditions. These citations, however, were mainly limited to introductory comments in the EOB
narratives and were probably designed by the EOB pioneers to acknowledge that there was
contemporary research relating to decision making within organisations more broadly. It is also
manifestly the case (especially once the case studies have been completed) that if any nearcontemporary movement had a major role in shaping EOB, it was the movement within which
it was conceived, namely the public choice movement. This explains why the behavioural and
managerial theories of the firm are considered as a postscript to this chapter only. Still, the
degree to which there was cross-fertilisation is considered in further detail in the case studies
in the chapters that follow.20
To conclude, several themes emerge from this brief review of the way bureaucracy was treated
in classical political economy, classical public administration, and Austrian economics. First,
it is shown that, through time, theorists oscillated between pessimism and optimism with
respect to the contribution of bureaucracy to social welfare and that these swings in sentiment
reflected the broader intellectual mood concerning the role of the state in society. Thus, taking
the three main traditions considered in this chapter in chronological order, most of the early
classical political economists in the age of ’Old Corruption’ claimed that bureaucracies
misallocate resources; the classical public administration theorists in the Progressive or New
Liberal era claimed that bureaucracies run along rational lines could serve the public; and the
Austrians (and indeed the EOB pioneers) in the age of the rising welfare-cum-socialist state
emphasised the economic failings of bureaucracy. Second, the theorists under review differed
in relation to the way they analysed the relationship between the agent and bureaucratic
structure. Some assumed that self-regarding individuals exploit the incentives provided by the
institutional structure of bureaucracy to pursue their own objectives, while others assumed that
the structure could be designed to induce individuals to serve the goals of the bureaucracy.
Third, some presented bureaucracy as a solution to a problem in society (say, by the way
bureaucracy selects the most competent and dispassionate bureaucrats to implement public
policies with utmost efficiency), while others presented it as a cause of a problem (say, by the
way it subjugates a society previously governed by voluntary cooperation and exchange under
a hegemonic rule). None of these theorists, however, developed a fully-fledged economic
theory of bureaucracy in the fashion presented by the EOB pioneers.

20
In fact, as will be shown in the next chapter, it is evident that the fertilisation possibly proceeded in both
directions, with Williamson (1967b) drawing upon the Tullock-Downs hierarchical-distortion model to explain
the limits that are placed on firm size.
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3.1 Introduction
Gordon Tullock delineated the key features of EOB when he published The Politics of
Bureaucracy in 1965. He may be considered the founder of EOB if citation acknowledgements
of his priority are used as a criterion for this title. His priority in this domain is further supported
by the fact that his book remained in manuscript form for over a decade before it was
published.1 Tullock’s basic premise is that bureaucrats are self-interested agents who pursue
objectives that diverge from the stated objectives of the bureaucracy and, ultimately, do not
serve the interests of society. This is because bureaucrats operate within non-market and
hierarchical environments, and hence they seek to maximise their status, power, and salary by
ascending a hierarchy rather than wealth by exchanging goods and services evaluated in the
marketplace. This, in turn, means that bureaucrats enter what Tullock called ‘political’
relationships between subordinates and superiors within a hierarchy rather than ‘economic’
relationships between equal contracting agents in the marketplace. These semi-feudal
relationships give rise to a principal-agent problem within what Tullock called a hierarchicaldistortion model, since bureaucrats within the hierarchy have an incentive to advance their
careers by transmitting false or distorted information both up and down the chain of command
if it portrays them in a good light. This problem is magnified by an adverse selection problem
in which unscrupulous agents are more likely to populate the bureaucracy because, in the
absence of market signals, they are more likely to succeed in ascending the hierarchy by
distorting information and directives. The Wilsonian-Weberian vision of professional
bureaucrats diligently pursuing the public interest is therefore rejected.
In this chapter I analyse Tullock’s account of EOB. It is the first of three case studies devoted
to examining the conceptual frameworks, models, and rhetoric of the EOB pioneers and, like
the following two case studies, will be constituted by five main sections. In section 3.2 I present
a brief biography of Tullock’s life prior to the publication of The Politics of Bureaucracy to
give some context to the immediate forces that shaped its nature. In section 3.3 I outline
Tullock’s EOB conceptual framework in two parts: his conception of the bureaucrat as a
1
It is liberally cited in Niskanen (1971, pp. 8–9, 25, 27, 117, 131, 170, 201) and Downs (1967, pp. 28, 44, 79,
116, 119, 121, 133–135, 140, 146, 154, 163–164). Downs (1964, p. 10) also cited it as a manuscript in his early
RAND paper on bureaucracy. As mentioned in the previous chapter, Mises’ Bureaucracy (1944) is not usually
presented as part of this EOB tradition, and hence as a candidate to be a foundation EOB text.
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rational economic agent and the institutional environment that shapes the way this bureaucrat
pursues objectives. In section 3.4 I delineate the hierarchical-distortion model that is derived
from Tullock’s larger conceptual framework. In section 3.5 I review the method and rhetoric
deployed by Tullock to advance his EOB framework and especially focus on the way he
employed military and feudal analogies to persuade the reader that bureaucrats are restricted
to ‘political’ relationships within a hierarchy. In section 3.6 I trace the extent to which Tullock’s
hierarchical-distortion model was successful in the intellectual marketplace and offer a
summary of my findings.
3.2 Biographical Context for Tullock’s EOB
Gordon Tullock (1922–2014) was born in Rockford, Illinois and studied law at the University
of Chicago.2 His formal economics training consisted of a single subject taught by Henry C.
Simons, which he did not complete due to the entry of the U.S. into the Second World War.
He was drafted into the U.S. 9th Armored Division in 1941 (Rowley & Houser, 2012, p. 5).
This division was initially deployed in England as a decoy and then redeployed to France for
the final assault on Nazi Germany. Upon returning from his military service in 1945, Tullock
completed a law degree at Chicago, had a short-lived legal career, and then worked as a
diplomat for the United States Foreign Service from 1947 to 1956. His time in the Foreign
Service, which included a period of service in China during which the Communist Party took
power, awakened his interest in economics and academic research (Tullock, 2012). Tullock’s
diplomatic career was not entirely successful. He did not ascend the hierarchy; his reports on
the Far East were repeatedly ignored by his supervisors; and he attributed his disappointments
to the way “vote-driven politicians formulated policy without consulting the professionals”
(Rowley & Houser, 2012, p. 10). It is likely that these early and frustrating experiences within
bureaucracies coloured Tullock’s subsequent analytical vision and approach to government
bureaucracy (and politics generally). They certainly explain the excessive number of military
and diplomatic anecdotes he later deployed to illustrate the way bureaucrats pursue their selfinterest, rather than the public interest, when operating within non-market and hierarchical
environments (e.g., Tullock, 1965, pp. 40–43).
Tullock was prompted to draw upon his career experiences to write an economic treatment of
2
Various accounts of Tullock’s professional biography and intellectual contributions have been published, most
notably Brady and Tollison (1991), Rowley (1991, 2004b, 2012), Rowley and Houser (2012), Mueller (2012,
2016), Shughart and Tollison (2016), and Wagner (2018). See also remembrances of Tullock by Clark and Lee
(2015), Congleton (2015), Tideman (2015), and Yandle (2015) in the March 2015 issue of Public Choice.
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bureaucracy after reading Mises’ Human Action (1949/1998) three times when he was studying
Chinese at Yale University (Levy & Peart, 2017, pp. 22–23). He was especially inspired to
deploy Mises’ method of praxeology to model agents (such as bureaucrats) as purposeful and
self-interested agents who strive to achieve different objectives (such as ascending a hierarchy
or maximising wealth) in different institutional frameworks. This signals a rare methodological
link between Austrian economics and public choice, which, as mentioned in the previous
chapter, seldom cross-fertilised due to the different approaches to government failure within
the two traditions. This Austrian influence, which is explored further in the next section, was
later highlighted by Tullock in an essay dedicated to Mises on his ninetieth birthday. Tullock
there paid tribute to Mises for broadening his vision of economics to include the analysis of
non-market environments: “Mises was among the first to point out that economics can be
expanded to deal with many areas outside of its traditional scope. In my own case, my work in
expanding economics into new areas was, in a real sense, begun by my reading of Human
Action” (Tullock, 1971, p. 375).
Tullock gave the resulting manuscript on bureaucracy to James Buchanan when they first met
at a conference in Philadelphia in 1957 (Rowley & Houser, 2012, p. 12). It sparked an
immediate, if not famous, working relationship between them. Tullock was offered a one-year
post-doctorate fellowship to join Buchanan at the Thomas Jefferson Center for Studies in
Political Economy at the University of Virginia in 1958. Not long after this one-year stint
Tullock began a joint project with Buchanan to write what would become The Calculus of
Consent (1962), which was one of the seminal works that launched the Virginia School of
public choice as an intellectual movement.3 Tullock became a tenured Associate Professor at
the University of Virginia just as this seminal book was issued. He thereafter helped Buchanan
to institutionalise public choice at the Jefferson Center. This involved participating in the
establishment of a journal called Papers on Non-Market Decision-Making, which was
eventually renamed Public Choice, and subsequently acting as its founding editor from 1966
to 1990 (Buchanan, 2003, p. 5; Rowley, 2004b). These endeavours reinforced Tullock’s
commitment to the behavioural symmetry hypothesis that was then dominant within Virginian
public choice (i.e., that self-interest should be assumed in non-market environments if it is
assumed in market environments), and to explain the causes and inefficiencies of the rapidly
expanding welfare state (including its bureaucracy).

3

For the history of Virginia School see Breit (1987), Medema (2011), and Levy and Peart (2020).
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The herculean efforts to bring The Calculus of Consent to print and to institutionalise public
choice at Virginia also partly explains why the initial manuscript on bureaucracy remained
unpublished for several years. It was, however, widely circulated and even cited in its
unpublished form, including by Anthony Downs (1964). The long gestation of Tullock’s
manuscript was finally brought to issue in 1965, when it was published as The Politics of
Bureaucracy (hereafter TPB), and then only after undergoing substantial stylistic and editorial
changes by Buchanan. These changes included pruning the excessive number of anecdotal
accounts of Tullock’s own bureaucratic experiences to make way for more analytical
exposition.4 Buchanan (1987, p. 11) later declared that TPB was a ground breaking text which
“turned the whole post-Weberian quasi-normative approach to bureaucracy on its head”. 5
Starting from the mundane hypothesis that bureaucrats, like other people, respond to incentives,
the bureaucrat was recast by Tullock from a noble and efficient public servant in the idealised
Wilsonian-Weberian fashion to an economic agent who pursues his or her own interests within
the bureaucratic hierarchy.
3.3 Conceptual Framework of Tullock’s EOB
Tullock’s conceptualisation of the bureaucratic agent and the institutional environment in
which he or she operates constitutes the EOB conceptual framework from which he derived a
model of bureaucratic inefficiency. Tullock himself developed his positive analysis of
bureaucracy by first characterising the individual bureaucrat as a rational agent and then
delineating the institutional environment that shapes both the agent’s objectives and the means
of obtaining these objectives. Consider these concepts under the following two sub-headings.
Behavioural Assumptions of Bureaucrats
Tullock began his analysis by proposing that bureaucrats are self-interested individuals who
respond to incentives in the same way individuals do in the marketplace (Tullock, 1965, p. 32).
This suggestion, though apparently mundane, was the catalyst for the revolutionary incursion
of rational choice modelling into the domain of bureaucracy, which hitherto was dominated by
4
While impressed by Tullock’s analysis of bureaucracy, Buchanan (1987, p. 11) opined that “Then, as now,
Tullock’s work was marked by his refusal to write (everything is dictated) as well as by his apparent inability to
separate analytical exposition from personal anecdote”.
5

Unlike Downs (1967) and Niskanen (1971), Tullock did not explicitly challenge Weber’s account of bureaucracy,
nor the landmark publications of the wider public administration literature, such as Wilson (1887), in which
bureaucrats are presented as professionals who selflessly pursue organisational objectives. At least one early
reviewer censured Tullock for not engaging with the existing literature (Kaufman, 1966). Tullock’s rejection of
the Wilsonian-Weberian orthodoxy is nonetheless obvious from the arguments presented in his text.
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the more idealised and normative representations of public officials advanced in sociology and
public administration theory (Niskanen, 2012, p. 97). Although the use of rational choice
theory to model political or non-market behaviour is often criticised as unrealistic and even
immoral (see Kelman, 1987; Pressman, 2004), Tullock pointed out that much of administrative
theory was in fact based on an equally, if not more, reductionistic understanding of man as a
mindless automaton that passively carries out the objectives of the government machinery. In
his words:
Many people seem to think that man is a small machine. If given a task he will simply
go ahead and perform it in a completely mechanical manner. By contrast, I think that
every man is an individual with his own private ends and ambitions. He will only
carry out assigned tasks if this proves to be the best way of attaining his own ends,
and he will make every effort to change the tasks so as to make them more in keeping
with these objectives. A machine will carry out instructions given to it. A man is not
so confined. (Tullock, 1965, p. 32)
Tullock’s use of rational choice in the domain of bureaucracy also meant that the bureaucrat,
as an individual, is treated as the basic unit of analysis; that is, methodological individualism
is assumed. This enabled him and subsequent EOB theorists “to put flesh and blood on the
bureaucratic man, to equip him with his own power to make decisions,” and thereby to provide
a positive analysis of how bureaucracies actually behaved (Buchanan, 1965, p. 4).
It is important to note, however, that Tullock’s close reading of Mises’ Human Action induced
him to adopt a conception of rational choice or homo economicus that significantly diverges
from the usual neoclassical conception of this entity. Unlike the neoclassical economist,
Tullock did not presume that individuals have perfect knowledge and maximise utility in an
instant by choosing a bundle of goods from a preference field that obeys the law of transitivity.
He instead followed Mises by presenting humans as striving purposefully, though imperfectly,
toward various ends and basing their choices on “different ‘information’ about the real world”
in a way that “expects to disturb” them the least and in which errors can be made (Tullock,
1965, pp. 27–29). Furthermore, contrary to what several commentators suggest, Tullock, at
least in his early years, did not necessarily assume that the rational behaviour of homo
economicus is narrowly self-seeking or materialistic. 6 He instead contended that rational
behaviour simply implies that “individuals will always choose more of what they want rather
than less, and less of what they do not want rather than more” (McKenzie & Tullock,
1975/2012, p. 9). From this perspective, individuals do not only pursue “creature comforts or
6

See, for instance, Buchanan (1987), Breit (1987, p. 650), and Brady and Tollison (1991, p. 144).
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large bank accounts” (Tullock, 1965, p. 30), but also heterogenous values and goals ranging
from the selfish to the altruistic. The precise goals individuals pursue and the rational means
they use to attain them are shaped by the institutional environment in which they are placed.
This is, in part, because the institutional environment includes a selection mechanism that
favours individuals who pursue certain objectives and use certain means to attain them (Tullock,
1965, pp. 16–18). The non-market and hierarchical environment of a bureaucracy, for example,
contains an adverse selection mechanism that favours bureaucrats who advance their career in
the hierarchy by opportunistically satisfying their superior’s non-monetary utility, an issue that
is returned to immediately below. Thus, Tullock diverged from the neoclassical conception of
rational choice in which a Robbinsian maximiser pursues known goals with clearly identified
means within a close-ended optimisation set. He instead adopted an open-ended conception of
rational choice in which individuals determine the ends they want to pursue and discover the
best possible means to attain them given the constraints in their immediate environment.7
The selection mechanism within Tullock’s model of rational behaviour is sufficiently novel
and important for comprehending his account of bureaucratic behaviour that it needs to be
explored further. Tullock (1965, p. 26) contended that a hierarchy within a bureaucratic
organisation which is not held to account by profit and loss statements tends to be dominated
by self-regarding agents who are “intelligent, ambitious, and somewhat unscrupulous”. This is
because, in the absence of a profit-loss metric to align the interests of individuals, a bureaucratic
organisation has an adverse selection mechanism (even though he did not use these precise
words) that favours ambitious individuals who are especially skilled at appealing to the nonmonetary utility of their supervisors, which often involves flattery, and opportunistically
communicating only information that is to their advantage. As such, rational behaviour in such
organisations entails making the expedient decisions that lead to one’s own advancement
within the hierarchy rather than the ‘moral’ or principled decisions that further the objectives
of the organisation (Tullock, 1965, pp. 22–26). In other words, unscrupulous individuals, or
the narrowly self-seeking homo economicus, have a comparative advantage in the Darwinian
scramble for promotion because they strive to meet the merit selection criteria of a bureaucracy
in a way that is less constrained by moral codes (Tullock, 1965, p. 31). 8 Tullock added,
7

He later repeated these sentiments by claiming that human rationality simply means that people “are able to
determine within limits what they want and will strive to fulﬁll as many of their wants as possible” (McKenzie &
Tullock, 1975/2012, p. 8; see also Mises, 1949/1998, p. 13). For an extensive discussion of the Austrian influence
on Tullock’s interpretation and use of rational choice see Boettke and Candela (2018).
8

Tullock (1965, pp. 29–30) accepted that agents can also succeed if they rationalise their self-interested behaviour
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however, that the magnitude of this comparative advantage is determined by the degree of
organisational “efficiency”, which he defined in a Smithian manner as the extent to which the
incentive structure aligns self-interested behaviour with ‘moral’ behaviour (which, again, he
presumed is equivalent to fulfilling the objective of the organisation).9 He argued that for-profit
firms are relatively more “efficient” in aligning private and organisational objectives within
their hierarchies because profit-loss accounting makes it easier to measure an individual’s
contribution to these objectives (Tullock, 1965, p. 21). Such metrics are, however, not readily
available to bureaus in non-market environments. Tullock thereby took a key Weberian trait of
bureaucracy, merit selection, and flipped its implication on its head; that is, a non-market
selection mechanism, to borrow Tim Besley’s (2006) language, populates bureaucracies with
‘unprincipled’ rather than ‘principled’ agents.10
Bureaucracy as Hierarchical Coordination between Superiors and Inferiors
It should be apparent by this point that the agents described immediately above operate within
a specific institutional environment – namely, a non-market bureaucracy – which shapes the
way rational individuals behave. Tullock (1965, p. 125) essentially conceived bureaucracy as
a hierarchical organisation that exists “for the purpose of performing some coordinated task”.
He was therefore preoccupied with modelling the internal coordination of activities within
bureaucratic organisations. Specifically, central to Tullock’s economic analysis of bureaucratic
conduct is the superior-subordinate relationship between individuals within the administrative
hierarchy. Tullock proposed that, from the perspective of any given bureaucrat, everyone in
his or her organisation can be generally divided into those of higher rank (superiors or
sovereigns), equal rank (peers), or lower rank (inferiors). Tullock illustrated this division in
as serving the greater good but added that they therefore act “as if” they have selfish motives. This argument is
quite different from the common “as if” argument in favour of the narrow homo economicus assumption; namely,
that it is a productive modelling device when agents have self-regarding motives to a degree (see Brennan &
Buchanan, 1988). Indeed, Tullock’s allowance for motivational heterogeneity and institutional selection process
once again suggests that his reputation for imperialistically interpreting social phenomena through the narrow lens
of homo economicus is slightly more complex than usually suggested (see footnote 6 above).
9

Recall that Adam Smith examined the relative success of various institutional arrangements in harnessing the
self-interest of individuals to advance the well-being of the broader society as part of his comparative institutional
analysis (see section 2.2).
10

Thus, organisations in market arenas are more likely to achieve their objectives, and hence, paradoxically, are
more likely to be “moral” than organisations in non-market arenas. Another implication is that organisations are
guided by moral behaviour because they are efficient rather than the reverse. Niskanen (2012, p. 99) focused on
this aspect of Tullock’s framework, arguing that whereas public administration theorists promoted moral
behaviour via personnel training to generate organisational efficiency, Tullock promoted organisational efficiency
to generate moral behaviour. Finally, the narrowness with which Tullock used the term moral in this context is
easily caught by imagining SS soldiers following a code to efficiently pursue the objectives of their organisation.
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Figure 1 immediately below. The top quadrant represents the individuals who act as the
bureaucrat’s superiors or sovereigns in the hierarchy, and the bottom quadrant represents
inferiors who are the bureaucrat’s subordinates. The two quadrants on the left and right side
represent the bureaucrat’s peers. Those within the hierarchy who are so far removed from the
bureaucrat to affect his or her personal advancement are considered spectators and are
positioned outside the circle. The most important people in the bureaucrat’s environment are
the sovereigns who either reward or sanction the bureaucrat for his or her performance (Tullock,
1965, p. 51).

Figure 1. Tullock’s (1965, p. 35) representation of power relations in a bureaucracy

Tullock (1965, p. 11) used this diagram to illustrate his important distinction between an
“economic” situation in which individuals largely interact with each other as contracting equals
who freely undertake mutually beneficial exchanges, and a “political” situation in which a
subordinate defers to a superior in a highly personalised manner. He posited that the angle
formed by the intersecting lines in Figure 1 represents the range of alternative choices or the
degree of economic freedom enjoyed by the individual. The lines are therefore vertical in pure
“economic” situations such as in perfectly competitive markets because everyone interacts with
each other as equal peers. On the other hand, the lines tend towards horizontal levels in more
“political” situations such as in the military or a feudal society because people largely relate to
each other on a hierarchical basis (Tullock, 1965, pp. 35–36).
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Tullock contended that public sector bureaus are largely comprised of feudal-like ‘political’
relationships. This is because government employees, once entrenched in their bureaucratic
careers, tend to lack alternative employment opportunities outside the public sector that yield
a return equal to their current income (Tullock, 1965, p. 12). This, in turn, means that the cost
of withdrawing from government employment is usually sufficiently high that bureaucrats rely
on the goodwill of superiors for their personal advancement within the hierarchy. 11 The
redeployment costs of exiting the bureaucracy, in other words, effectively makes the
government a monopsonist employer of the bureaucrat. Bureaucrats are therefore generally
predisposed to “finding out what their superiors want” and please them as best they can, even
if it means reporting distorted information to their superiors to secure favourable terms for their
own welfare (Tullock, 1965, p. 12). According to Buchanan (1965, p. 6), Tullock’s distinction
between ‘economic’ and ‘political’ relationships also provides a plausible explanation of the
origins of economic rent and a tentative theory of the relationship between those who pay and
receive economic rent. In this context, it is interesting to note that Oliver Williamson (1979,
1981, 1985), within what became known as Transaction Cost Economics, famously (and
independently) codified situations involving redeployment costs as bilateral monopoly
environments in which agents lose assets specific to a joint act if they break the (incomplete)
contract binding that act, and thereby have an incentive to behave opportunistically to
appropriate the rents arising from this ‘asset specificity’. The striking of a contract therefore
entails a ‘fundamental transformation’ from an ex ante competitive environment (akin to the
‘economic’ situation) to an ex post bilateral monopoly environment (which, once suitable
governance structures are in place, is akin to the ‘political’ situation).12 Niskanen (2012, p. 98)
nonetheless emphasised the richness of Tullock’s less formal approach in a back-handed way,
stating that “for someone who has never married”, he had “a very subtle understanding of
bilateral monopolies”.

11

Tullock readily accepted that these ‘economic’ and ‘political’ relationships are not mutually exclusive and exist
in degrees in both market and non-market institutions. There is, in other words, a spectrum in which ‘political
relationships’ are more prominent when agents have fewer alternatives. Tullock, however, presumed that
bureaucrats predominantly reside in a domain of ‘political’ relationships and proceeded to model them as
opportunistic climbers. Catallactics therefore plays no role in the ‘political’ relationships of Tullock’s early EOB
research program. This is paradoxical, to say the least, given his early Austrian colours and preoccupation with
exchange in political markets in his other writings. The ‘political’ relationships within a bureaucratic hierarchy
were not self-consciously re-codified as exchange relationships until Breton and Wintrobe (1982).
12
It should be emphasised that Williamson’s Transaction Cost Economics is manifestly a separate, but nearcontemporary, tradition to EOB (see Earl & Potts, 2011; Williamson, 2010). One of the more interesting
differences between the two traditions is that Williamson eventually saw bureaucratic hierarchies as the means to
reduce opportunistic behaviour, while Tullock saw them as the cause of such behaviour.
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3.4 Tullock’s Model of Hierarchical-Distortion in Bureaucratic Process
Tullock derived an operational model of bureaucratic inefficiency from the conceptual
framework that was delineated in the previous section. This model, which became known as
the hierarchical-distortion (HD) model, is almost a matter of logical deduction once Tullock
postulated his ideal type of the ‘career bureaucrat’ and the chief characteristics of a bureaucratic
institution. As the name suggests, Tullock’s HD model relates to the hierarchical nature of
bureaucracy. The intended role of a bureaucratic hierarchy is to coordinate the actions of selfinterested individuals to achieve the bureau’s objectives in an efficient manner. One of the
main challenges confronting the head of a bureau is therefore to overcome what is now called
the principal-agent problem. That is, the head of a bureau must coordinate the actions of
subordinates so that they reach decisions which he or she would have reached if he or she
“possessed as much information about the particular situation requiring decision as they do”
(Tullock, 1965, p. 141). Such coordination naturally involves both the communication of orders
down the bureaucratic hierarchy and the reporting of information up the hierarchy. The
subordinates, however, are self-interested agents who, once entrenched in the political
relationships that dominate non-market bureaucracies, seek to advance their careers by
opportunistically distorting the information they communicate both down and up the
bureaucratic hierarchy. Consider each type of communication in turn.
Senior bureaucrats must clearly communicate their orders down the hierarchy to their
subordinates, as well as supervise their actions, to accomplish their desired objectives.
However, as their original instruction travels down the hierarchy, a certain percentage of the
instruction is inevitably lost or distorted as bureaucrats at each node in the hierarchy, given
their cognitive and time constraints, selectively interpret and pass on to their subordinates the
information they deem the most important. Tullock (1965, p. 137) likened such human error in
the mis-transcribing of information to a game of ‘whispering down the lane’, which is also
known as ‘Chinese whispers’ or the ‘telephone’ game. Moreover, bureaucrats exercise their
discretion according to their own objectives and hence selectively execute parts of the order
that increase their likelihood of promotion. This incentive-induced distortion is especially
exacerbated in a non-market bureaucratic organisation since (a) the contribution of each
division to the bureau’s objectives cannot be measured via monetary profit-loss accounting and
(b) institutional bias against moral rectitude makes it more likely that unscrupulous agents hold
positions within the hierarchy via the earlier mentioned Darwinian natural selection process.
As a result, Tullock hypothesised that a significant portion of activities in a bureaucratic
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hierarchy do not align with the objectives of the bureau due to the inherent knowledge
constraints in managing information flows and the way self-interested bureaucrats
opportunistically distort information and selectively obey orders.
Hierarchical distortion is also expected to occur when facts are being reported up the hierarchy.
This is because subordinates always have more knowledge relating to a particular problem than
their superiors, and hence, with little chance of being discovered, they have an incentive to
report only information that allows them to curry favour with their superiors, especially as this
is their chief means of advancement in the hierarchy. This means that the intelligent and
ambitious subordinate tends to report facts that are most congruent with his superior’s beliefs
while leaving out contradictory facts that would result in the superior’s disutility and hence
undermine his or her chance of promotion (Tullock, 1965, p. 69). Such misinformation is, as
already mentioned, almost entirely unchecked in non-market bureaucracies because of the lack
of market discipline and the institutional bias against moral rectitude in such bureaucracies.
Tullock (1965, p. 70) thus concluded that real bureaucracies tend to be poorly organised and
diverge from the ideally efficient organisation because “factual information tends to flow from
the top down instead of from the bottom up”.
Given the problem of hierarchical distortion, Tullock contended that non-market bureaucracies
tend to fail in their hierarchical coordination of internal activities. Furthermore, they suffer
declining marginal efficiency in relation to their size and hence experience significant
constraints on their performance as they expand. That is, due to the progressive loss of topdown control and bottom-up information, bureaucratic output increases at a slower rate than
labour input as a function of the number of layers of supervision required in the hierarchy
(Niskanen, 2012, p. 99). Large government bureaucracies that do not sell goods or services in
the marketplace are therefore unlikely to accomplish their assigned tasks because superiors
cannot ensure that subordinates act in a manner consistent with the organisation’s stipulated
goals (Tullock, 1965, pp. 142–144). Large private firms, by contrast, are comparatively more
efficient in their allocation of inputs to produce goods and services as market prices and profitloss accounting align individual self-interest and enable economic calculation to meet the
complex and changing needs of society (Tullock, 1965, pp. 161–164). Thus, whereas the
rational self-interest of individuals in markets (i.e., homo economicus) often leads to
unintended public virtues, the rational self-interest of individuals in political bureaucracies (i.e.,
homo politicus) leads to public vices. Adam Smith’s ‘paradox of virtue’ is thereby turned on
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its head.
3.5 Tullock’s Economic Method and Rhetoric
Tullock (1965, pp. 14–15) deployed Weber’s method of understanding (Verstehen) to persuade
the reader that his EOB conceptual framework (and attendant HD model) was plausible. It is,
of course, ironic that he drew upon Weber’s own methodology to recast the bureaucrat from
the Wilsonian-Weberian ideal of a noble professional to an economic agent, though Tullock
himself makes no reference to this. Weber’s method of understanding involves the theorist
sympathetically placing him or herself in the position of the human actor being analysed (i.e.,
the bureaucrat) and introspectively imagining how he or she would behave under similar
circumstances (i.e., in a bureaucratic organisation); that is, it entails appealing to the reader’s
“intuition and experience” (Tullock, 1965, p. 15). 13 This, in turn, amounts to deploying
historical anecdotes, metaphors, analogies, thought experiments, generalising from a few vivid
particulars, and other rhetorical devices to convince the reader that agents act like ‘economic
men’ within non-market and hierarchical systems. Such a methodology had become
unorthodox in North American economics by the 1960s due to the increasing acceptance of the
contention that mathematical modelling and inferential statistic techniques should take priority
in the act of economic persuasion. The two methodological approaches are, however, not
logically incompatible, since (as Downs and Niskanen also stressed) the hypotheses that
emerge from persuading readers to see the particulars in this new light may be formalised and
empirically corroborated (in a more conventional fashion) in due course. As Buchanan (1965,
p. 5) presciently remarked in his foreword to TPB, even though Tullock’s theory of bureaucracy
is “less fully developed than is the analogous ‘theory of markets’”, his work will be “an
important helpmate to whoever chooses to elaborate it”.
The act of drawing upon the Weberian method of understanding by appealing to the readers’
“intuition and experience” gave Tullock far greater license to deploy rich rhetoric compared to
his orthodox contemporaries. 14 Tullock’s act of ‘rhetorical redescription’ and associated
13
Mark Blaug (1992, p. 43) helpfully explained that “[t]he German term Verstehen denotes understanding from
within by means of intuition and empathy, as opposed to knowledge from without by means of observation and
calculation; in other words, first-person knowledge that is intelligible to us as fellow human beings, instead of
third-person knowledge that may not correspond to anything that can be grasped in human terms”.
14
Wagner (1987) provided a comprehensive account of Tullock’s methodology over his entire career and
attributed the rich rhetoric in Tullock’s larger body of work to the “avowedly rhetorical” nature of the legal
discipline in which he was initially trained. There is, however, no reason why the rhetorical turn in TPB
specifically may not also be attributed to the method of understanding.
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rhetorical strategies may therefore be reconstructed without too much exegetical effort. Two
analogies especially loom large in the text: the military and the feudal.
Firstly, Tullock (1965) presented countless military anecdotes and literary references that turn
on bureaucratic behaviour, and thereby drew analogies between war-time military hierarchies
and peacetime civilian hierarchies (see pp. 41, 43, 51, 75, 118, 131, 137 for examples). These
references were designed to appeal to the memories of the middle-aged ex-servicemen from
the citizen armies of World War Two and the Cold War of the innumerable cases in which they,
once bound in service for the duration, observed some of their less than noble comrades
manipulate the military hierarchy to advance their own interests. This analogy has a twofold
effect: the re-deployment or exit costs that bind modern bureaucrats to the political relationship
distantly resembles the exorbitant costs of desertion from the armed services (i.e., court martial
and possible execution) and the manoeuvrings of civil bureaucrats resembles the way
subordinates in the armed services surreptitiously fight the monolithic, bloated and hopelessly
inefficient Total War hierarchies to achieve their own ends. The reader is therefore induced to
accept the two key drivers in Tullock’s system by considering an extreme case of a political
relationship, even though, as Tullock (1965, p. 13) himself admitted, they are often only strong
tendencies in civilian bureaucracies.
Secondly, Tullock (1965, pp. 102–105) repeatedly illustrated the world of the modern
bureaucrat by referring to the servile behaviour of courtiers and other subordinates in a feudal
court. This is easily the most important analogy in the text. Its rhetorical power is again twofold:
the way the various servile ranks (from villein to vassal to chamberlain) were bound in service
to the feudal lord captures the way bureaucrats could not easily seek alternative employments
and the way unscrupulous sycophants of courtier life manoeuvred for self-advantage resembles
the way bureaucrats manipulate the subordinate-superior power relationship to ascend a
hierarchy. Tullock’s (1965, pp. 78, 113–115) use of terms such as “sovereigns”, “lords”,
“courtiers”, “barons”, and “equerries” was also likely to register with his readers. The venal
nature of a feudal court was, for one, the ‘furniture of the mind’ of educated readers due to the
dominance of Shakespearean plays in the then curriculum, while university instructors (i.e.,
Tullock’s primary audience) witnessed such behaviour first-hand in their own hierarchies.15
15

Tullock drew upon numerous contemporary novels to appeal to the ‘intuition and experience’ of his readers,
but strangely did not appeal to the campus novels of his day that capture the experiences of his primary readership
(i.e., university instructors), such as C. P. Snow’s The Masters (1951) and Mary McCarthy’s The Groves of
Academe (1952). Also note that the magnified register of this courtly analogy for those familiar with Shakespeare
is caught in Trevor Nunn’s 1996 film adaption of The Twelfth Night where a feedback loop is created with the
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Buchanan (1965, p. 5) himself sought to explain Tullock’s vision by using a slave-economy
analogy, but admitted that serfdom “may be a more descriptive term, especially since Tullock
finds many practical examples for his analysis in feudal systems”. The feudal analogy also
figures in the Cartesian diagrams, such as in Figure 1 above, that Tullock used to illustrate his
vision.
3.6 Tullock’s Influence and Conclusion
Tullock identified a principal-agent problem that is internal to a non-market bureaucratic
organisation and caused by the divergence of interests between bureaucrats at each level of the
hierarchy. The rhetoric that accompanied his analysis was both impressively rich and
reasonably effective. It constituted a form of linguistic reframing that appealed to the intuition
and experience of readers in the 1960s to see bureaucracy in a different light. The reader who
did not have any direct bureaucratic experience was encouraged, via military and feudal
analogies, to perceive bureaucrats as self-interested agents who are effectively bonded to
working within a bureaucratic hierarchy and thereby resort to exploiting political relationships
to ascend this hierarchy by sending false communications both downwards and upwards. The
reader who had some type of experience of bureaucracies in the past, whether it be limited
service in the military or a lifetime of service to a university, was encouraged to recall the way
political relationships were exploited by the more unscrupulous of their former comrades for
personal advancement. Tullock also persuaded his colleagues that his insights had merit.
Downs (1964, 1967) and Niskanen (1971) immediately drew upon Tullock’s conception of the
bureaucrat as a self-interested ‘economic man’ and Downs extended Tullock’s HD model in
several different directions. Indeed, given his early influence on these figures, it is reasonable
to argue that he was the founder of EOB or at least the first mover.
The EOB visions advanced by Downs and Niskanen are the subject of analysis in the next two
chapters and hence they need not detain us here. It is, however, worthwhile at this point to
explore a 1965 JPE article by Monsen and Downs in which Tullock’s HD model (then still
residing in an unpublished manuscript) was applied to corporate bureaucracies. This detour is
justified both because it led to the further formalisation of the HD model and because it
demonstrates Tullock’s immediate impact on his contemporaries. Monsen and Downs (1965)
recruitment of Nigel Hawthorne as the sycophantic and self-regarding courtier, Malvolio, to channel Hawthorne's
representation of Sir Humphrey in Yes Minister and Yes Prime Minister in the 1980s. It is also telling that this
adaption is set in the Austro-Hungarian empire, which was renowned for its professional bureaucracy. I would
like to thank the Shakespearean scholar, Chris Wortham, for this reference.
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contended that corporate managers may fail to maximise profits not only because of a principalagent problem caused by the divergence of interests between shareholders and senior
management (which I will call the ‘external’ principal-agent problem), but also because of a
principal-agent problem caused by the divergence of interests and associated HD process
within the corporate hierarchy (which I have been calling the ‘internal’ principal-agent
problem). They thereby contributed to the post-war challenge to the neoclassical theory of the
firm that was described in chapter two of this thesis. Recall that this challenge entailed
proposing sales (Baumol, 1959), growth (Marris, 1964), managerial expenses (Williamson,
1967a) or some other maximand as alternatives to the default goal of profit-maximisation.16
Monsen and Downs’ 1965 narrative, along with the publication of Tullock’s manuscript in the
same year, then prompted Williamson (1967b) to mathematise the HD model (which he called
a “control-loss” model) to capture the constraints on the size of a firm resulting from the
distortion of information and instructions in longer chains of command. Note, however, that he
attributed this distortion to bounded-rational agents mis-transcribing information and
instructions in serial reproduction processes (in the fashion of ‘Chinese whispers’) rather than
to employees deliberately distorting information to serve their self-interest (1967b, p. 127).
Williamson further argued that the distortion increases with the size of the firm due to the
extension of the hierarchy and that this model resolves a long-lasting debate over the existence
of diseconomies of scale in firms (see Kaldor, 1934; Penrose, 1959/2009; Ross, 1952–3), as it
explains why managerial inefficiencies cannot be eliminated through time via a discovery
process. An optimum degree of hierarchy is also derived from Williamson’s model. This
approach was further developed by Williamson (1970, p. 110) in Corporate Control and
Business Behavior, where he adapted his initial position by including both deliberate and nondeliberate sources of distortions.
The HD model, for all its immediate impact, was strangely marginalised within the EOB
literature in a matter of years. Tullock’s TPB was thereafter mainly cited only in passing in
surveys of EOB publications for initiating the economic analysis of bureaucracy.17 The quick

16
As mentioned in section 2.5, the research program devoted to conceptualising corporate managers as agents
who pursue non-profit objectives in many ways mirrors the EOB program devoted to conceptualising bureaucrats
as agents who pursue their self-interest, and thereby signals the possibility of early cross-fertilisation between the
two programs. Tullock himself, however, at no point cited this parallel program and believed that distortions are
less pronounced in corporations that sell a market good and assess divisions using profit-loss accounting.
17
See, for example, Orzechowski (1977), Rowley and Elgin (1988), Mueller (2003, p. 362). Tullock’s EOB was,
however, extended by Breton and Wintrobe (1982). More recently Tullock’s insights were applied by Christopher
Coyne (2008, 2013) to analyse post-war reconstruction efforts and state-led humanitarian actions.
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marginalisation of the HD model may be attributed to the rise in popularity of Niskanen’s (1971)
‘budget-maximising’ model. Niskanen eschewed analysis of activities within the bureaucracy
by shifting attention from the ‘internal’ principal-agent problem caused by the divergent
interests held by managers within the hierarchy to the ‘external’ principal-agent problem
caused by the divergence of interests between bureau sponsor and bureau chief. The reasons
for the eventual ascendancy of Niskanen’s EOB vision cannot be fully considered until the case
study devoted to this vision has been completed. However, from the analysis presented so far,
it can be speculated that the unorthodox Austrian hue of Tullock’s EOB vision is partly to
blame. Tullock’s account, reflecting his close reading of Mises in the gestation period of his
1965 book, is process-driven and bereft of the equilibrium economics and mathematical
formalism that define neoclassical economics. He also seems to be at times occupied with both
the incentive pathologies of bureaucracies that preoccupied the public choice theorists and the
knowledge and coordination problems that preoccupied the Austrians in the calculation debate
(e.g., Tullock, 1965, pp. 161–164). It is, in short, plausible that Tullock’s Austrian stance
dampened the persuasiveness of his 1965 tome because of its dissonance with the dominant
neoclassical vision. Niskanen (2012, p. 98) later highlighted the lack of neoclassical formalism
in Tullock’s 1965 narrative by dismissively likening his key diagrams (per Figure 1 above) to
“television station test patterns”. A related puzzle, which is not considered in this thesis for
want of space, is why Williamson’s formalisation of the HD model to derive the optimum firm
size also later faded from view, even though it resolved a long-standing controversy in
economics and immediately preceded his shift to Transaction Cost Economics. Williamson
(2010) himself strangely did not mention his contribution to this area of research in his Nobel
lecture.18
Tullock also did not develop the HD model further. He made a lesser-known contribution to
EOB in a 1974 paper titled ‘Dynamic Hypothesis on Bureaucracy’, which was itself an
extension of his 1972 review of Niskanen’s 1971 book.19 Tullock there drew upon the medianvoter theory to present a ‘dynamic hypothesis’ that explains the growth cycle of government
bureaucracy based on two premises. First, the demand for a bureau’s service is the sum of the
demand by bureaucrats and non-bureaucrat citizens, with the former exhibiting a higher
18

Note, however, that a plausible explanation for Williamson’s own disengagement from (or possibly redirection
of) this research program is that he turned to bureaucratic hierarchy as a solution to, rather than a cause of,
allocative inefficiencies once he embraced Transaction Cost Economics in the 1970s.
19

The paper was an extension of his review of Niskanen’s 1971 book on bureaucracy (Tullock, 1972). See also
Niskanen (2012, p. 100) for his comments on Tullock’s dynamic hypothesis.
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demand because their income is linked to the provision of these services. Second, bureaucrats
face a choice of exploiting an increase in demand for their bureau’s service by either increasing
their own wages or hiring more bureaucrats (which thereby further raises the joint demand).
Tullock used these two premises to hypothesise that bureaucrats continue to push for
bureaucratic expansion until they have accumulated sufficient political power (viz., voting base)
to directly increase wages. At that point the bureaucrats cease to employ more bureaucrats and
solely exploit their political power to raise their pay. Workforce attrition will therefore begin
to occur, which over time reduces the aggregate demand for the bureau’s service and hence the
political power of the bureaucrats. This sets off a dynamic cycle of bureaucratic growth and
attrition as bureaucrats switch between the two rent-seeking strategies. Tullock thereafter left
EOB to make numerous other substantial contributions elsewhere in economics.
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Chapter 4: Anthony Downs
4.1 Introduction
Anthony Downs first presented his EOB vision in a nascent form in a RAND monograph in
1964 before publishing it in a fully realised, and much elongated, narrative entitled Inside
Bureaucracy in 1967. His EOB framework in many respects resembles the one presented by
Tullock in 1965 described in the previous chapter. Downs presumed, like Tullock, that
bureaucrats potentially possess heterogeneous motives and operate within non-market and
hierarchical organisations. Unlike Tullock, however, he posited that bureaucratic organisations
do not always favour self-regarding individuals via a fixed adverse selection mechanism.
Instead, Downs argued that different types of people with different motivations are favoured
via a dynamic selection mechanism that evolves throughout the life cycle of a bureau. He
further argued that the types of people chosen via the changing selection mechanism affects
the organisation’s structure and overall performance. Downs drew upon these behavioural and
institutional specifications of bureaucratic organisations to formulate two important economic
models that contained operational or testable relationships: the bureau life-cycle-selection
(LCS) model and his version of the hierarchical-distortion (HD) model, which he called the
information-directive distortion model. The implication of Downs’ EOB vision is that the
potential for bureaucratic failure (like government failure more broadly) is higher than his
contemporaries presumed.
In this chapter I analyse the nature of Downs’ approach to EOB, the method he employed to
model bureaucracy, and the rhetoric he used to persuade readers that his EOB was plausible.
In section 4.2 I present a brief biography of Downs’ life and academic career prior to his
contribution to EOB to give some context to the ideas presented in his account. In section 4.3
I outline Downs’ EOB conceptual framework in two parts: his conception of ‘bounded rational’
bureaucrats with diverse motivational dispositions and his representation of the non-market
and hierarchical environment that selects and shapes these bureaucrats. In section 4.4 I
delineate the bureau LCS model and a version of the HD model that emerged from Downs’
conceptual framework. In section 4.5 I review the method and rhetoric employed by Downs to
develop his EOB analysis, and especially focus on the way he used caricatures to emphasise
motivational diversity and organic analogies to emphasise changes within the bureaucracy. In
section 4.6 I trace the impact of Downs’ EOB vision and offer a brief conclusion.
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4.2 Biographical Context for Downs’ EOB
Anthony Downs (1930–2021) was a pioneering figure in public choice theory who is now best
known for applying economic logic to model the rational choice of voters and political parties.
He was born in 1930 in Evanston, Illinois, graduated with a BA from Carleton College, and
completed an MA and a PhD at Stanford University. 1 Downs was prompted to turn to public
choice issues by Kenneth Arrow, who acted as his doctoral supervisor, and after reading the
proto-public-choice analysis contained in Joseph Schumpeter’s (1942/2014) Capitalism
Socialism and Democracy (Downs, 1993). His doctoral dissertation, which was published as
An Economic Theory of Democracy (ETD) in 1957, is now widely regarded as one of the
founding texts of the public choice movement, if not a classic in economics.2 It was in this
work that Downs famously demonstrated that self-interest could not explain voter behaviour
(now known as the voter paradox) and further codified the median-voter theorem (Grofman,
2008, pp. 92–93). These early contributions to the public choice canon demonstrate that he was
comfortable thinking about non-market actors as self-interested agents independently of the
Virginia public choice movement and before he turned his attention to EOB.
After completing his PhD, Downs served in the Navy as an intelligence officer for three years;
joined his father’s consulting company, Chicago’s Real Estate Research Corporation (RERC),
in 1959; and taught at the University of Chicago from 1959 to 1962. His consulting work for
RERC occupied an increasing amount of his time as the years passed and his involvement in
this entity partly explains why he took an interest in urban economics for much of his career.
He nonetheless continued to undertake original and applied research in a range of disciplines
while serving various government committees and thinktanks. Indeed, Mike Munger (2022, p.
2) contended that the breadth of Downs’ contributions is sufficiently impressive that it “defied
easy categorization”. This, paradoxically, may explain why he was not even more recognised
and why his recent passing attracted relatively little attention compared to the other EOB
pioneers.
Downs’ primary research interest did not shift to the theory of bureaucracy until he worked on
projects sponsored by RAND from 1963 to 1965. He published several papers on this subject
(Downs, 1964, 1965, 1966; Monsen & Downs, 1965) before finalising his theory in Inside
1

For Downs’ professional biography see Grofman (2008) and Pennington (2014). For his obituaries see Hagerty
(2021), Schudel (2021), Somin (2021), Roberts (2021), and Munger (2022).
2

ETD was identified by Grofman (2004, p. 31) as one of the “Public Choice Pentateuch”.
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Bureaucracy (1967). One of the objectives at RAND was to make the Defense Department
more efficient and accountable, and its role in shaping Downs’ research seems indisputable
given that he explicitly thanked the United States Air Force and RAND “for supporting” his
research on EOB under “Air Force Project RAND” (Downs, 1967, p. xii). Amadae has even
claimed that ‘rational-choice’ politics (read public choice) was shaped by RAND in her 2003
book Rationalizing Capitalist Democracy: The Cold War Origins of Rational Choice
Liberalism. Although Tollison (2004) has convincingly argued that Amadae’s thesis is
overstated, there is little doubt that RAND’s brief to rein in the excesses of the defence
establishment during the 1960s played a role in the development of EOB, if not public choice
more broadly (see also Medema, 2000, pp. 292–293). Tollison (2004, p. 242) is certainly wrong
to state (almost bizarrely) that Downs and Niskanen had no “serious Rand [sic] connections or
interests (if any)”.
It also should be emphasised that Downs developed his EOB vision after diligently engaging
with the existing scholarship on bureaucracies (from Weber to Mises); mastering the ‘theory
of the firm’ literature of the 1950s and 1960s (see sections 2.5 and 3.6 of this thesis); and
drawing upon the testimonies relating to bureaucracies offered by more experienced
contemporaries.3 He was, however, especially influenced by Tullock’s work on the subject and,
indeed, was one of the first to recognise the value of Tullock’s entrepreneurial contribution to
the economic analysis of bureaucracy. He specifically acknowledged that he was inspired by
Tullock’s TPB manuscript in his first EOB publication, which was a RAND working paper
(Downs, 1964, p. 10n7), and stated in his 1967 book that: “My greatest debts are to Gordon
Tullock, whose ideas inspired my approach and are utilized extensively throughout the analysis”
(Downs, 1967, p. vii). Downs presented Tullock’s hierarchical-distortion model, but within a
framework that radically extended Tullock’s EOB vision by allowing for ‘motivational
heterogeneity’ when modelling self-interested bureaucrats. This is elaborated upon in the
sections that follow.
4.3 Conceptual Framework of Downs’ EOB
As mentioned in the introduction, and like Tullock, Downs developed a conceptual framework
in which bureaucrats are just as self-interested as agents in the private commercial sphere.
Unlike Tullock, however, Downs presumed that these self-interested bureaucrats are motivated
3

For example, Downs (1967, p. vii) stated that William Jones’ “experience and insights regarding large
organizations enabled me to test many of my hypotheses and who contributed several key concepts”.

50

Chapter 4: Anthony Downs
to pursue different goals – some of which are not self-regarding – and those with a certain subset of motives tend to dominate at different times via environmentally dependent selection
processes. This framework is based on two sets of principles: (1) behavioural assumptions that
generate heterogenous agents with different motivations and (2) institutional features that
underpin the selection of certain types of agents under certain environments and determine the
way bureaucrats with different motives are coordinated to serve an organisational objective.
Each is considered in turn under two sub-headings.
Behavioural Assumptions of Bureaucrats
Downs (1964, p. 4, 1967, pp. 84–85) postulated two behavioural axioms: firstly, bureaucrats
seek to attain their goals as efficiently as possible given their limited capacities and knowledge
constraints, and, secondly, bureaucrats generally have a complex set of goals, but different
types of bureaucratic personalities prioritise different subsets of these goals. With respect to
the second axiom, Downs identified the general goals of bureaucrats as including five selfregarding motives (power, income, prestige, security, and convenience) and four broader
motives (loyalty to one’s workgroup, organisation, or nation; pride in one’s own work; desire
to serve the public interest; and commitment to a specific ideology or mission). He then
generated five ideal-type bureaucrats, each driven by a particular preference for a different
subset of goals, such that motivational heterogeneity may be said to exist; that is, although
agents potentially pursue an array of objectives, some agents pursue different subsets of these
objectives.4 Two of these ideal-type bureaucrats are purely self-regarding officials: “climbers”
are solely concerned with climbing the career ladder to maximise power, money, and prestige,
and “conservers” seek to retain the security and personal comforts they enjoy in their present
position. Three others are “mixed-motive” officials who are also driven by broader social
motives: “zealots” are loyal to a narrow set of policies or ideals, “advocates” identify their
personal welfare with their bureau and are oriented to advance its mission and objectives, and
“statesmen” pursue the general welfare of society as they see it. The latter closely resemble the
altruistic civil servants often assumed in public administration literature. Downs further
proposed that a bureau’s nature is dependent on which of these ideal types dominate the
4

Brennan (2009, p. 135) and Brennan and Hamlin (1995, p. 42) referred to this type of modelling technique as
“motivational heterogeneity” (but not in relation to Downs), while Simmons (1999, p. 269) called it “motivational
diversity” specifically in relation to Downs’ EOB. This heterogeneity strategy again suggests that Downs was
influenced by the ‘theory of the firm’ literature in the late 1950s and early 1960s in which motives other than the
pursuit of profits are presumed and to which he himself contributed (Monsen & Downs, 1965). See, for example,
the matrix of motives and associated references cited in Williamson (1967a, Chapter 3).
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organisation. This is itself dependent on the selection mechanism, which is discussed at the end
of this section when Downs’ institutional assumptions are scrutinised.
Downs (1967, p. 3), like Tullock, also assumed that bureaucrats do not operate in the ‘perfectly
informed’ world of neoclassical theory and, instead, emphasised the “ineradicable uncertainty”
that they face due to knowledge and time constraints. Downs explicitly drew on Herbert
Simon’s (1955, 1957; March & Simon, 1958) bounded rationality and satisficing theory to
outline a behavioural theory of learning and adaptation whereby bureaucrats search for and
adopt behavioural patterns that would improve their utility in light of their existing knowledge
and environment, and, further, prompt them to shift their behavioural disposition whenever
their environment changes (Downs, 1967, pp. 168–170). The implication of such a conception
of human rationality is twofold. Firstly, bureaucrats are presented as satisficing decisionmakers with limited capacities and time to make decisions and hence must selectively
communicate information and orders that they deem the most important in relation to their nonmonetary utility. Such constraints and satisficing behaviour, in turn, contribute to the
information distortions that are captured in Tullock’s hierarchical-distortion model (see section
3.4) and in the hierarchical-distortion model developed by Downs himself (see section 4.4).
Secondly, bureaucrats are modelled as alert human actors who adapt to changes in their
surrounding environment, such that they either adjust their behaviour in a way that includes
changes to the sub-set of objectives they pursue to maximise their expected utility or exit the
bureau to find another bureaucratic environment that is most compatible with their individual
preferences.5
Bureaucracy as Hierarchical Coordination and Selection
Downs extended Tullock’s account of the institutional characteristics of bureaucracy in several
directions. He defined a bureaucratic organisation as one that possesses four attributes: 1) it is
sufficiently large that the highest-ranking officers personally know less than half of the staff in
the bureau, 2) the staff are predominantly paid full-time workers, 3) personnel selection is
based on “merit” as assessed by a supervisor, and 4) more than half of its output is not evaluated
by the market (Downs, 1964, pp. 2–3, 1967, pp. 24–25). In other words, a bureau is a large,
non-market administrative organisation composed largely of full-time staff whose career
5
Note that Downs appears to have accepted that utility-maximising behaviour in neoclassical economics and
satisficing behaviour in Herbert Simon’s decision-making theory are reconcilable, and hence continued to use the
vocabulary of the former.
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advancement depends on a supervisor’s assessment. Downs claimed that several other
Weberian traits – such as hierarchical organisation, impersonality of operation, extensive use
of rules, and strict employment of specialists – can be logically derived from the four primary
attributes (Downs, 1967, p. 25). He added, however, that bureaucracies also contain forces that
“inhibit” the full development of some of these secondary characteristics. He argued, for
instance, that bureaucrats spontaneously develop informal rules and relationships within the
formal bureaucratic structures described by Weber, both to pursue their private ends and the
objectives of the organisation (Downs, 1967, p. 63). The spontaneous emergence of such
informal structures can have mixed effects on the overall behaviour and efficiency of an
organisation. This is because informal procedures and relationships can both enhance
efficiency by rendering each bureaucrat’s behaviour more predictable and reduce efficiency by
allowing bureaucrats to exploit personal associations to pursue self-interested ends (Downs,
1967, pp. 68–73). Downs, in short, identified something akin to an internal contradiction within
the Weberian bureaucracy: the formal and impersonal elements of a bureaucracy, originally
designed for organisational efficiency, have the unintended consequence of generating
informal and personal elements which may in turn undermine the formal design and purpose
of the bureaucracy. Downs therefore advanced a theory of bureaucracy with greater realism
and predictive power by supplementing the formal Weberian model of bureaucracy with a
positive analysis of the personal interactions and exchanges within the bureaucratic hierarchy.
Downs also stressed that the hierarchical nature of bureaucracy, even if a secondary
characteristic, is an especially important institutional feature since all large, non-market
organisations must possess such structures to coordinate activities. Although Downs’ account
of hierarchy as a coordinating device is derived from Tullock’s and resembles it in many ways,
he placed greater emphasis on the way hierarchical structures arise to coordinate the actions of
heterogeneous agents in different environments. Specifically, a “Law of Hierarchy” is
proposed according to which the “coordination of large-scale activities without markets
requires a hierarchical authority structure” (Downs, 1967, p. 52). In other words, in the absence
of profit-loss signals to appraise human action, a hierarchy is required to resolve internal
conflicts arising from agents possessing different motives and perceptions of reality, as well as
to ensure the effective communication of relevant information and directives. Downs suggested
that the optimum number of hierarchical tiers depends on the degree of conflict expected. Tall
hierarchies (i.e., narrow spans of control and many levels) are required when the organisation
is subject to more internal conflicts, such as when the bureau has a complex and ambiguously
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defined set of goals or is populated with officials with heterogeneous members. Conversely,
flat hierarchies (i.e., wide spans of control and few levels) are required when the organisation
is subject to fewer internal conflicts, such as when the bureau has a small number of clearlydefined goals or is populated with officials with largely homogenous members. In any case,
Downs envisioned the bureaucratic organisation as a single multi-level authority structure
which he depicted in a diagram as shown below.

Figure 2. Downs’ (1967, p. 117) uniform hierarchy model of bureaucracy

The other institutional feature that is central to Downs’ framework is the dynamic selection
mechanism embedded in the bureaucratic organisation that permits agents with certain
dispositions to dominate a bureaucracy at different times. Like Tullock, and as already
mentioned, Downs presumed that bureaucrats have heterogeneous motives and that
bureaucratic institutions screen for bureaucrats with certain motives and capacities. Unlike
Tullock, however, he posited that bureaucratic organisations do not necessarily narrowly select
self-regarding individuals. Instead, he surmised that the selection process dynamically adjusts
according to the stage of ‘life cycle’ that the bureau is in, such that different motivations tend
to dominate at different stages. An expanding bureau, for example, draws in zealots and
provides opportunities for climbers, while an organisation that ceases to grow is better suited
to conservers. Thus, whereas Tullock granted that agents have different motives but posited a
fixed selection process that yields motivational homogeneity (i.e., a self-seeking quest to
ascend a hierarchy), Downs presented a changing selection process that generates motivational
heterogeneity. The integration of heterogenous agents and the screening effects of institutions
makes Downs’ modelling of bureaucracy unique in the public choice tradition, which tends to
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focus on the incentive properties rather than the selection properties of institutions.6 He thus
offered a nascent analysis of the selection process of institutions that until recently received
little attention in public choice and political economy more broadly (Besley, 2006; Brennan &
Hamlin, 2002).
4.4 Downs’ Models of Bureaucracy
Downs derived models of bureaucratic activity with operational relationships from the
conceptual framework delineated in the previous section. As in the case of Tullock’s approach,
these models are almost a matter of logical deduction once Downs posited the behavioural and
institutional properties of bureaucracies. The two most significant models that Downs deduced
from his conceptual framework are the bureau life-cycle-selection (LCS) model and the
information-directive distortion model. Each is considered in turn.
The central hypothesis of the LCS model is that bureaus, like humans, are subject to a life cycle.
Accordingly, Downs postulated that a bureau’s selection mechanism evolves to select for
different ‘ideal’ bureaucrats in different stages of the bureau’s existence, which in turn
influences the overall behaviour of the bureau. First, new bureaus are created when followers
institutionalise the beliefs and practices of a charismatic leader; or when a new bureau is split
off from an existing bureau; or when a group of people undertake entrepreneurial actions to
support a policy or program (Downs, 1967, p. 5). These infant organisations tend to be
dominated by zealots and advocates who are committed to their organisation’s objectives.
Second, once bureaus experience growth after passing their “initial survival threshold” (in
terms of size and age), they attract climbers who vie for opportunities to fast-track their careers.
The recruitment of the more ambitious and innovative climbers then accelerates the capacity
for bureaus to expand in their size and scope. This, in turn, offers more opportunities and
thereby reinforces the selection of the ambitious climbers. Third, bureaus eventually face
diseconomies of scale due to growing administrative costs and internal machinations that divert
effort “away from action into administration” (Downs, 1967, p. 12), as well as allocative
constraints due to competition for resources and policy ‘territory’ from other bureaus. Norms
and formal rules are also employed to codify regular activities in mature bureaus, which,
though designed to improve productivity, cause organisational inertia. “Goal displacement”,
for example, arises when officials begin to preserve and conform to rules as ends in themselves
6

I would like to thank Geoff Brennan for this important insight in his feedback to my research proposal. For a
public choice modelling of motivational heterogeneity and institutional selection see Brennan and Hamlin (1995).
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(Downs, 1967, pp. 18–19). Such an environment favours conservers who wish to maintain the
status quo and induces climbers with transferrable skills to move to other bureaus. Some agents
also transform themselves into conservers once promotion opportunities are exhausted. Downs
(1967, p. 99) labelled this dispositional change the “Law of Increasing Conserverism [sic]”,
that is, there is in every bureau “an inherent pressure upon the vast majority of officials to
become conservers in the long run”. The overall significance of Downs’ LCS model is that the
nature of a bureaucratic organisation varies depending on whether the selection mechanism
favours bureaucrat ‘types’ with motivations that align with or diverge from the stated goals of
the organisation.
Downs’ information-directive distortion model is manifestly derived from Tullock’s
hierarchical-distortion model. As in the case of Tullock’s model, distortions occur in upward
communication of information because there are time and mental constraints on the number of
facts a subordinate can feasibly pass on to a superior and, further, subordinates are motivated
to emphasise or suppress information according to their self-interest. Distortions also occur in
the execution of directives downwards because superiors at each level in the hierarchy convey
orders according to their own interests (Downs, 1967, pp. 116–119). Curiously enough,
although bureaucrats vary widely in their motivational dispositions in Downs’ model, they are
all culpable for intentionally distorting information and directives within the hierarchy. Even
‘principled’ agents such as the zealots and advocates are presumed to participate in this
distortionary process. This is because they have an incentive to convey favourable information
that could advance their agency’s mission or their own ‘altruistic’ ideological agenda and
minimise unfavourable information that could jeopardise this mission or agenda. Thus, Downs
introduced the notion of ‘altruistic distortion’ – to sit alongside Tullock’s more self-regarding
distortionary behaviour – as another contributing factor to inefficiency in non-market
hierarchies (Simmons, 1999). It seems odd, however, that Downs did not discuss whether the
magnitude of hierarchical distortion may vary according to the type of bureaucratic personality
that dominates a bureau at a given stage of its life cycle. After all, some bureaucratic
personalities (say, zealots) in principle often have a vested interest in the formal goals of their
bureau compared to other types (say, conservers) and hence it seems reasonable to think that
they are more likely to pursue the objectives of the organisation and thereby minimise
distortions within the administrative hierarchy. Indeed, the feedback loop between bureaucratic
growth and bureaucratic personality in the LCS model suggests that Downs presumed that
agents generate different levels of hierarchical distortion within their organisation (and thereby
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affect the organisation’s marginal output and growth) according to their dispositional character.
In other words, by allowing for motivational heterogeneity Downs had the intellectual
resources for a richer institutional analysis of bureaucratic organisations, yet he failed to exploit
those resources by prematurely collapsing all motivational dispositions into a uniform
behaviour— that of mere information and directive distortion.
4.5 Downs’ Economic Method and Rhetoric
Downs adopted a more conventional positivist methodology to justify his conceptual
framework compared to Tullock’s Weberian method of understanding. He deduced models
from this framework that contain operational relationships and hence testable propositions.
Downs (1967, p. 83) also deployed a division-of-labour argument to justify his decision to
leave this testing for others to complete. The precision with which he typically derived these
testable propositions induced Richard Wagner (1968, p. 85) to describe his analytical
exposition as “verbal mathematics”. Unfortunately, his ambitions grew between his initial and
justly famous 1964 RAND working paper and his 1967 book of the same title in such a way
that the number of hypotheses, laws, and testable propositions he proposed swelled to nearly
100, often via needless sub-divisions (see the itemised list in Downs, 1967, pp. 261–280). Key
themes are lost in this maze and, indeed, it is apparent that some of these propositions are not
even syllogistically derived from the basic “axioms” presented at the start of his book as
outlined in section 4.3 above (Crecine, 1969, p. 183). Downs’ methodological intent is
nonetheless demonstrated by his quest to demarcate so many testable propositions. This ultrapositivism did not, however, preclude him from using striking analogies as rhetorical devises
to persuade the reader of the wisdom of his frame. This is dramatically seen in the way the
different motives of the ideal-type bureaucrats are thrown into sharp relief through the labels
chosen for these types, while always presenting them as rational and self-interested.
First consider the goal of exaggerating difference. Downs’ ideal-type bureaucrats are
caricatures or idealised representations that exaggerate certain dispositions bureaucrats
possibly possess and are designed (or indeed drawn) to generate in the reader’s imagination the
possibility that bureaucrats with different heterogenous mixtures of motivations exist within a
bureaucracy. ‘Zealot’ invokes the image of a person who, though in principle not entirely
selfish, fanatically pursues narrow ideological goals in a manner that most would regard as
abnormal or unacceptable. ‘Climber’, which is the closest resemblance to Tullock’s bureaucrat,
conjures up the image of an ambitious and opportunistic sycophant who musters all available
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resources to scale the bureaucratic ladder. ‘Conserver’ creates an image of a stereotypical
bureaucrat who seeks to delay action, obfuscate, and prevent any change that would upset his
or her routine. ‘Statesman’ presents a vision of the ideal politician who competently discerns
and virtuously pursues the public interest. Downs himself granted that this typography of
idealised types is unconventional and to some extent arbitrary.7 He nonetheless justified his
bureaucratic caricatures on instrumentalist grounds. That is, though his ideal types arbitrarily
simplify human actors to the point of exaggeration, their final worth is judged by the extent
they generate successful predictions: “the particular forms of simplification and arbitrariness
developed here enable us to make forecasts about the behaviour of officials and bureaus that
will hopefully prove more accurate than forecasts made with alternative forms” (Downs, 1967,
p. 4).
The ‘caricatures’ that populate Downs’ bureaucracy also induce the reader to sympathise with
the different bureaucratic agents portrayed in his analysis and accept that certain motives (such
as serving the public interest or an agency’s mission) can fall under the rubric of rational selfinterest. Consider, for example, the zealot. Although the term is now used as a pejorative label
for individuals who are fanatical and uncompromising in the pursuit of their ideological
agendas, it also conveys to readers a peculiar kind of selflessness in their devotion to some
external ‘sacred’ cause that has become their single overriding purpose. This has theological
roots. The word ‘zeal’ was regularly used in first-century Palestinian Judaism in relation to
various kinds of Jews who were “zealous for God and the Torah and some of whom carried
that ‘zeal’ to the lengths of violence” (Wright, 1992/2013, p. 180; cf. Horsley, 1986; Smith,
1971). The Jewish tradition of ‘zeal’ – which dates from the Maccabean revolt through to the
memories of Phineas and Elijah in the Old Testament scriptures – entailed an active
propagation of the Jewish ancestral way of life according to the Torah and resolutely defending
it against external threats and internal corruption. During Israel’s occupation by Rome, many
Jewish movements claimed to be acting out of their ‘zeal’ for God, especially in their resistance
against the Roman suppression of their national life and identity. Though the historical and
theological context of the term is now lost, ‘zealot’ still depicts someone who is resolute and
uncompromising in pursuing an objective broader than his or her narrow self-interest, albeit in

7
It also breaks with the behavioural symmetry maxim, which was then central to public choice theory. It is perhaps
for this reason that Downs (1967, p. 91) at times downplayed the heterodox significance of this aspect of his
theory: “[a]lthough we make use of our typology of officials in all parts of our theory, a majority of our conclusions
and propositions — including many of the most significant — are independent of these types”.
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a manner others may find extreme or fanatical. Downs drew upon this connotation to depict
some bureaucrats as ‘zealots’ and thereby conceived a type of rational agent who maximises
the objectives of a bureau (at least in its early founding) which, according to conventional
public choice logic, fall outside the utility function of self-interested individuals (Simmons,
1999). Such a ‘rhetorical redescription’ in effect encourages the economist to perceive otherregarding motives as part of a bureaucrat’s rational self-interest. The same perception would
not have been achieved if Downs had instead employed terms such as “Agent with Motive X”
or “devoted to” or “enthusiastic about” an organisation’s mission. Similar readings, drawing
on other analogies, could be given for his other ‘mixed-motive’ bureaucrats such as the
advocate or the statesman.
It also should be emphasised that Downs drew upon additional analogies when deducing these
models from his larger conceptual framework. The organic analogy that is central to his LCS
model is especially striking. The bureau is depicted as an adaptive whole that, like an organic
creature, behaves differently according to the “stage” of life: birth, youth, maturity, and old
age. The changing bureaucratic environment also naturally selects (in a Darwinian fashion)
bureaucratic types who then shape the bureau’s nature. Furthermore, towards the end of his
book, Downs (1967, p. 213) contended that animal territorial behaviour is “strikingly relevant
to the behavior of bureaus” that compete for resources in the same policy space, and thereby
drew an analogy between “animal territoriality” and inter-bureau competition (see Figure 3
below).8 Organic analogies of this sort have repeatedly failed to resonate with professionally
trained economists who, rightly or wrongly, are still beholden to the mathematical physics
analogies that were introduced during the Marginalist surge of the mid-Victorian era to justify
neoclassical equilibrium economics and mathematical formalism. This failure is writ large in
Alfred Marshall’s unsuccessful (and some suggest half-hearted) attempt to superimpose
organic analogies onto the mechanistic features of neoclassical economics (Hodgson, 1993,
2013). Downs’ organic analogies do not, as a result, figure prominently in the EOB literature.

8
The U.S. navy and air force, for example, compete to deliver similar missile systems. Downs (1967, p. 216)
proposed a ‘Law of Interorganizational Conflict’, whereby “[e]very large organization is in partial conflict with
every other social agent it deals with”.
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4.6 Downs’ Influence and Conclusion
Downs both drew upon and deviated from Tullock’s EOB vision. He followed Tullock by
focusing on a principal-agent problem that is caused by a divergence of interests between
bureaucrats at each level of the hierarchy and which is internal to a non-market bureaucracy.
He deviated from Tullock, however, by co-joining this internal principal-agent problem with
motivational heterogeneity rather than motivational homogeneity; that is, the self-interested
bureaucrats pursue different objectives over the life cycle of the bureaucracy because the
selection mechanism that favours certain bureaucratic types evolves with the changing
bureaucratic environment. The deployment of motivational heterogeneity in this way is Downs’
most unique and important contribution to EOB – even if he did not fully flesh out its
implications for the internal principal-agent problem. The rhetoric that accompanied his
analysis, moreover, vividly illustrates this important insight. It induced readers to see the
bureaucrats as heterogeneous agents who pursue a range of objectives, under the monikers such
as ‘zealots’ to ‘conservers’, rather than uniform agents who pursue the same self-regarding
objectives. Unfortunately, for all this, his EOB approach did not gain traction in the research
agendas of most of his colleagues in the years that followed. As mentioned in the previous
chapter, he successfully promoted a version of Tullock’s HD model (i.e., the internal principal-
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agent problem) in Monsen and Downs (1965) and this, in turn, prompted Williamson (1967b)
to formalise it mathematically to account for diseconomies of scale within commercial
organisations (rather than non-market bureaucracies). But this model and its Williamsonextension dropped from view in economics by the early 1970s. There is also no evidence that
his larger EOB vision led to a sustained research programme in EOB or elsewhere in the
economics discipline and there is overwhelming evidence that it was displaced by Niskanen’s
EOB vision when the latter was articulated in the early 1970s.
As in the case of Tullock’s framework, it is likely that Downs’ important insights relating to
selection processes and motivational heterogeneity were overshadowed by Niskanen’s model
because, at least in part, he did not represent them in an acceptable analytical form and suitable
Cartesian space. These ideas are, again, explored at greater length once Niskanen’s EOB vision
is reviewed in the next chapter, but certain conclusions can be tentatively drawn here. Downs’
models are process-driven and presented in narrative form rather than governed by equilibrium
economics and presented in mathematical form. In some ways Downs’ account reads more like
an economic sociology of bureaucracy, in the style of Schumpeter, rather than orthodox
economic theory. Recall also that Williamson (1967b) himself explicitly censured Monsen and
Downs (1965) in a high handed (if not dismissive) manner for failing to use a formal
mathematical model to capture the HD process. Downs’ tree diagram (to represent hierarchies)
and territory diagram (to represent bureaucratic competition) are, moreover, as unsophisticated
as Tullock’s ‘television test pattern’ diagrams. The organic analogies Downs employed, which
had failed to take hold in orthodox economics since Marshall’s day, also did not help. This
interpretation is supported by the way Downs’ framework is more acceptable in disciplines less
beholden to equilibrium analysis and mathematical formalism, such as public administration
and political science (Dunleavy, 1991; Simmons, 1999). Impressive analogies involving
zealots and climbers could not, in short, compensate for these departures from the norm.
It is also possible that Downs’ EOB vision failed to gain traction because his excessive
ambition to present a grand and all-encompassing theory of bureaucracy caused him to slightly
botch its execution. The 1964 RAND paper in which he initially delineated the key features of
his EOB framework resembles the tight ‘verbal mathematics’ commonly used in economics
and, indeed, it mimicked the tight stylistic approach employed in his earlier, and highly
regarded, An Economic Theory of Democracy (1957); namely, deducing conclusions from
abstract premises in a syllogistic fashion. Unfortunately, however, his subsequent ambition to
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explain every aspect of bureaucratic behaviour gave rise to a bloated (but nonetheless valuable)
1967 tome with endless propositions and hypotheses that did not always syllogistically follow
from their premises. One reviewer stated that it reads like a “[catalogue] of the folklore of
government bureaucracy” and does not constitute a general theory (Crecine, 1969, p. 182).
Another commentator opined that although “[s]tudents and literary sociologists will love the
book’s candid, worldly-wise discussions”, researchers “will throw up their hands in dismay at
the thought of trying to devise empirical tests of its ‘propositions’; and theorists will shake their
heads in disbelief that such a hodgepodge of thoughts and speculations, however seminal, could
ever have been viewed as a ‘theory’” (Murray, 1968, pp. 829–830). This is, of course, a
reference to the earlier mentioned charge that the operational relationships in Downs’ models
are not always syllogistically derived from his axioms. Some of his concepts also appear almost
arbitrarily as a convenient way to explain a given phenomenon, only to disappear in the rest of
the book when it has served its purpose. Modern readers are therefore advised to consult the
1964 paper, a classic of its type, rather than the 1967 book (for all its good qualities).
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Chapter 5: William Niskanen
5.1 Introduction
Niskanen first presented his EOB vision in a 1967 address to the American Economic
Association and then in an extended narrative entitled Bureaucracy and Representative
Government in 1971 (see also Niskanen, 1968, 1975, 1978, 1983). He took the nascent EOB
conversation in a different direction in these publications by drawing upon the neoclassical
theory of the firm to model bureaucrats as budget-maximisers. He thereby expanded the
purview of neoclassical economics to include the marginal and equilibrium analysis of nonmarket bureaus. This, in turn, enabled him to analyse the comparative efficiency of the output
supplied by non-market bureaus and market organisations within the neoclassical paradigm.
Niskanen’s EOB approach also entailed a shift in focus from an internal principal-agent
problem caused by the divergent interests of the managers within the bureau (which occupied
Tullock and Downs) to an external principal-agent problem caused by the divergent interests
of the bureau chief and the sponsor who funds the bureau. Niskanen’s EOB publications in the
later 1960s and early 1970s attracted such widespread recognition and criticism in economics
and neighbouring disciplines that his budget-maximising model became the standard EOB
theory that had to be accepted or critiqued. Although Niskanen’s seminal contribution
represents a significant breakthrough that ultimately legitimised EOB as a bona fide field of
economic inquiry, the immediate grafting of Niskanen’s model onto standard economic theory
led to the marginalisation of the insights advanced by the other EOB pioneers.
In this chapter I analyse the nature of Niskanen’s EOB framework, the method he employed to
model bureaucracy, and the economic rhetoric he used to persuade readers that it was a
plausible account of bureaucratic institutions. This analysis is undertaken in five main sections.
In section 5.2 I present a brief biography of Niskanen’s life prior to the publication of
Bureaucracy and Representative Government to give some context to the immediate forces
that shaped his account of bureaucracy. In section 5.3 I outline Niskanen’s EOB conceptual
framework in two parts: his conception of the bureau’s budget as the self-interested chief
bureaucrat’s maximand and the institutional constraints that govern the bilateral exchange (in
which the budget is exchanged for bureau output) between the bureau’s chief and the bureau’s
sponsor. In section 5.4 I delineate the budget-maximising model and empirical implications
that arise from Niskanen’s conceptual framework. In section 5.5 I examine the rhetoric and
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method deployed by Niskanen to advance his EOB analysis and especially focus on the analogy
he draws between a bureau and the neoclassical firm. In section 5.6 I trace the immediate
impact of Niskanen’s budget-maximising model before offering a general conclusion.
5.2 Biographical Context for Niskanen’s EOB
William Niskanen (1933–2011) was born in Bend, Oregon; completed a BA from Harvard
University in 1954; and gained an MA in economics from the University of Chicago in 1957.1
His exposure to Chicago-style economics, which was primarily through Milton Friedman and
Arnold Harberger, had a formative impact on the way he later modelled public choice problems.
He once quipped that he “had the best of both worlds – a Harvard degree and a Chicago
education”. 2 Niskanen completed his doctoral dissertation on the economics of alcoholic
beverage sales under the supervision of Harberger in 1962 and then spent the early part of his
career working on planning and policy problems for the military. From 1957 to the early 1970s
he worked for a range of bureaucratic agencies, including the RAND Corporation, the U.S.
Department of Defense, the Institute for Defense Analysis (IDA), and the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB). It was while working for these organisations that he made a
major contribution to public choice by formalising EOB along mainstream economic lines.
Niskanen sought to deploy his Chicago training to improve the workings of the US government
bureaucracy after joining the RAND Corporation in the late 1950s and the Department of
Defense under the leadership of the Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara in the early 1960s.
These organisations heavily recruited economists over this period to develop techniques, such
as systems analysis and what came to be known as the Program Planning Budgeting System
(PPBS), to analyse defence policy problems and facilitate cost-effective budgeting in the
military.3 Niskanen was initially enthusiastic about the whole enterprise, recalling that it was
“an exciting period at RAND” because the tools of economics were used to develop policy
solutions for public officials to improve the efficiency of the public sector (Niskanen, 1971, p.
vi). High expectations collided with reality, however, and his confidence in this “information-

1

For Niskanen’s intellectual contributions see Wagner (2012). See also remembrances of Niskanen by Healy
(2011), Segal (2011), Shapiro (2011), Dudley (2012), Hederman (2012), Henderson (2012), Jordan (2012), Poole
(2012), and Zycher (2012).
2

The Cato Institute, “William A. Niskanen, A Life Well Lived,” YouTube Video, 1:35, April 13, 2012,
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YXoBCB4WtcY.
3

On the history and controversies associated with the use of systems analysis during McNamara’s tenure as the
Secretary of Defense see Wildavsky (1966), Schlesinger (1968), Rosen (1984), and Enthoven and Smith (1971).
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analysis-directive” paradigm for public sector management eventually evaporated. He became
acutely aware that the analytical techniques developed by RAND were insufficient to reduce
the wastage within what President Eisenhower called the ‘military-industrial’ complex,
particularly because these techniques ignored the personal incentives of public officials. He
recalled that 1964 was the specific year in which his “professional unease” crystallised into the
idea that “there is nothing inherent in the nature of bureaus and our political institutions that
leads public officials to know, seek out, or act in the public interest” (Niskanen, 1971, p. vi).
Niskanen continued to ruminate on this idea after moving to the IDA in 1964 and witnessing
the excesses that accompanied the escalation of the Vietnam war in the second half of the 1960s.
The mismanagement of the latter gave rise to a damning EOB account of the self-interested
senior figures in charge of this war, which included the claim that: “Maybe the field manuals
for U.S. commanders are based on Parkinson rather than Clausewitz” (Niskanen, 1971, p. 76).
The key catalyst for Niskanen to finally codify his economic theory of bureaucracy was his
interaction with Tullock who was recruited to do research at the IDA for a summer in 1966
(Niskanen, 1971, p. vi). Although their joint tenure at the IDA was brief, it was highly
productive. Niskanen credited Tullock for providing him with several key assumptions and
further admitted that they had simultaneously developed the key premise that transformed
Niskanen’s EOB model into something that resembled the theory of the firm; namely, that
“bureaus act as if they are maximizing their budget” (Niskanen, 2012, p. 101). Indeed, for
Niskanen this was the magical key that transformed the multiple objectives of a self-interested
bureaucrat into one maximand, which, in turn, allowed the deployment of conventional
marginalist techniques used in the neoclassical theory of the firm to model bureaucracies.
Given Tullock’s role in prompting Downs’ ideas (see section 4.2), this key piece of advice to
Niskanen reinforces the impression that Tullock represents something of a muse-cum-magus
in the emerging EOB conversation. Indeed, Niskanen (1971, p. vi) stated that “Tullock is
always provocative and stimulating. I and many others owe him a great debt for stimulating
our own thinking. At that stage it was difficult to sort out my ideas from those of Tullock”.
With Tullock’s encouragement, Niskanen first presented his idea of the budget-maximising
bureau in an address in 1967, which was published in 1968 in the American Economic Review
and eventually turned into his seminal book, Bureaucracy and Representative Government
(1971). Niskanen’s EOB vision, however, both diverges from the visions advanced by his
predecessors in important ways (even if he liberally cited Tullock and Downs) and ultimately
overshadowed their contributions. This divergence and overshadowing are explored further in
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the sections that follow.
5.3 Conceptual Framework of Niskanen’s EOB
Niskanen believed that the most important contribution that economics could make to the study
of bureaucracy is to provide a positive theory of the supply of public goods and services by
bureaus that is akin to the established (neoclassical) theory of the supply of private goods and
services by commercial firms (Niskanen, 1971, pp. 7–9; cf. Buchanan, 1965, pp. 3–4). He thus
focused on equilibrium and comparative statics questions such as: “For given demand and cost
conditions, how much output is produced at what total cost? How do these output and cost
levels change with changing conditions?” (Niskanen, 1971, p. 8). His ultimate objective was
to demonstrate that, for equivalent conditions, public bureaus radically oversupply goods and
services such that the allocation of resources by bureaus is Pareto inefficient. The pursuit of
this objective prompted Niskanen to shift his EOB research focus (and ultimately the entire
EOB conversation) from the hierarchical distortionary processes that transpire within the
bureau to the equilibrium outcome of a bargaining process between a bureau and its external
sponsoring body. The conceptual framework Niskanen advanced to achieve this research end
rests on propositions relating to a bureaucrat’s self-interested behaviour and the institutional
characteristics of bureaucracy that constrain this behaviour. Each is considered in turn.
Behavioural Assumptions of Bureaucrats
Niskanen’s account of what motivates bureaucrats is underpinned by a direct analogy between
what motivates a manager in a non-market bureau and the neoclassical assumption of what
motivates a manager in a profit-maximising firm. This analogy cannot be missed by even the
careless reader since he considered it in chapter four of his book under the heading: “The
Theory of the Firm, as an Analogy” (Niskanen, 1971, p. 36). Central to the neoclassical theory
of the firm is the assumption that managers maximise utility by choosing an output that
maximises profit, and that marginalist and equilibrium modelling techniques may be used to
determine this volume of output. Accordingly, central to Niskanen’s theory of the bureau is the
assumption that senior bureaucrats maximise utility by choosing an output that maximises the
budget allocated to them by the bureau’s sponsor, and that marginalist and equilibrium
modelling techniques may be used to determine this volume of output (Niskanen, 1971, pp.
36–37).
Niskanen could plausibly settle on budget-maximisation as the single maximand for a bureau
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through the simple, but ingenious, argument that the numerous objectives commonly pursued
by a self-interested bureaucrat (and hence which enter this bureaucrat’s utility function as
maximands or variables to maximise) are achieved in direct proportion to the size of the budget:
Among the several variables that may enter the bureaucrat's utility function are the
following: salary, perquisites of the office, public reputation, power, patronage, output of
the bureau, ease of making changes, and ease of managing the bureau. All of these variables
except the last two, I contend, are a positive monotonic function of the total budget of the
bureau during the bureaucrat’s tenure in office… It is not necessary that a bureaucrat’s
utility be strongly dependent on every one of the variables which increase with the budget,
but only that it is positively and continuously associated with the level of the budget.
(Niskanen, 1971, p. 38)
In other words, the multiple objectives pursued by a self-interested bureaucrat can be achieved
by maximising the bureau’s budget.4 Niskanen also claimed that variables – such as the ease
of making changes and the ease of managing the bureau – that are initially inversely related to
a growing bureau budget can still be positively linked to budget size. This is because managers
can use the larger budgets to hire additional junior bureaucrats to turn over their personal
burdens of managing the bureau. In addition, Niskanen contended that maximising budgets is
vital to the survival of the bureau, and hence the bureaucrat’s tenure, since the sponsors expect
the bureaucrat to aggressively propose more activities and higher budgets in each budget
review process (Niskanen, 1971, p. 40; see also Wildavsky, 1964, pp. 160–165). This is
because the sponsors, given their lack of time and comprehensive knowledge of the bureau,
evaluate the bureau’s activities at the margins by focusing on the proposed increments of the
bureau’s activities and signal their own priorities by selectively approving different portions of
the new budget proposal. A static budget demand is therefore likely to throw the sponsor’s
marginal valuation of the bureau’s activities into confusion and possibly cause the sponsor to
lose confidence in the proposition that the bureau is the best means to promote his or her own
agenda. As a result, Niskanen (1971, p. 42) concluded that the central motivation of bureaucrats
is to “maximize the total budget of their bureau during their tenure, subject to the constraint
that the budget must be equal to or greater than the minimum total costs of supplying the output
expected by the bureau’s sponsor”. Niskanen thereby derived motivational homogeneity in
effect by presuming that budget-maximisation is an instrument which achieves all the
bureaucrat’s heterogeneous objectives.
4
Rowley (1994) contended that public choice scholars generally accept that the utility functions of political agents
are multidimensional, even if they invariably presume that expected wealth is often important in any given
function.
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Bureaucracy as Budget Constraints on Individual Utility-Maximisation
Niskanen’s exclusive focus on budget maximisation radically shifted the institutional
environment that is relevant for modelling purposes from the internal hierarchy of the bureau
that governs and coordinates the interactions of bureaucrats (which interested Tullock and
Downs) to the features that govern the exchange between the chief bureaucrat seeking a budget
and the external sponsor providing the budget. That is, Niskanen shifted attention from the
internal functioning of a bureau that is important for the ‘internal’ principal-agent problem that
preoccupied Tullock and Downs to the institutional features that are important to an ‘external’
principal-agent problem. Such a shift is reflected in Niskanen’s (1971, p. 15) definition of a
bureaucracy as a non-profit organisation that derives a major share of its revenue from a
periodic appropriation or grant awarded by a sponsoring organisation rather than the sale of
output in a commercial market and, further, an organisation in which owners and employees
do not appropriate any share of the net revenue as personal income. This definition includes
most government agencies in western democracies as well as many non-profit organisations,
regardless of their size or managerial structure. 5 Such a shift also means that the use of a
hierarchy to coordinate the actions of self-interested bureaucrats (and the identification of the
associated distortions) is relegated to a ‘black box’ in the same way that the internal processes
of private firms are treated as a ‘black box’ in neoclassical price theory.
The exchange that determines the bureau’s equilibrium budget and output is initially conceived
by Niskanen as a bilateral-monopoly exchange between the chief bureaucrat (as the single
producer) and the sponsor (as the single consumer or client). Niskanen, however, quickly
proceeded to argue that the bargaining power resides entirely with the chief bureaucrat. This is
due, in part, to the problem of information asymmetry in which the sponsor has limited
knowledge of the bureau’s operational costs and, in part, to the assumed absence of competition
from alternative suppliers (Niskanen, 1971, pp. 25, 29–30).6 The bureau chief is therefore able
to present the budget proposal in an ‘all-or-nothing’ fashion such that the promised output of
5

While Niskanen’s definition formally excludes all private businesses, he acknowledged that the behaviour of
some components of profit-seeking firms, particularly large corporations, may resemble the characteristics of a
bureau. His response to this ambiguity was to propose, in a fashion similar to the proposals advanced by Tullock
and Downs: “the more difficult it is to identify a component’s contribution to corporate profits, the more likely
that the component will behave like a bureau” (Niskanen, 1971, p. 16).
6
Niskanen’s account of the chief bureaucrats’ bargaining power in relation to the sponsor became the subject of
much criticism in the secondary literature, with some arguing that it was overstated (see section 5.6 below). Note,
however, that Niskanen himself relaxed the passive sponsor assumption in the later chapters of his book (Chapters
13–16) and extended his model to consider the effects of bureaucratic competition and a more informed sponsor.
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the chief bureaucrat’s choosing is exchanged for the lump-sum budget. In other words, the
bureau chief effectively enjoys the same kind of bargaining power as a profit-seeking
monopoly that perfectly price discriminates (Niskanen, 1971, p. 25). Niskanen, on these
grounds, predicted that the self-interested chief bureaucrat will opportunistically exploit the
information asymmetry and monopolistic bargaining power to propose an output that is
incorrectly presented as maximising the net benefits of the sponsor (as a proxy for the public
interest), but in reality maximises the bureau’s budget (and hence the chief bureaucrat’s utility)
subject to a cost constraint. That is, the economic analysis of bureaucracy is reduced to a
constrained optimisation problem in which the chief bureaucrat maximises his or her utility by
maximising the bureau’s budget subject to the constraint that total costs do not exceed this
budget.
The institutional configuration of bureaucracy in Niskanen’s account essentially emphasises
the constraints faced by the chief bureaucrat in non-market organisations that are financed by
a largely passive external body or sponsor. In contrast to Tullock’s and Downs’ emphasis on
hierarchical coordination within non-market hierarchies, Niskanen’s conception of the
institutional features of bureaucracy is somewhat more reductionistic— his model assumes that
bureaus are solely run by a single chief bureaucrat (or, at most, a board of senior bureaucrats),
and hence they are devoid of internal collective action problems and hierarchical distortions.
Furthermore, the screening devices that yield either motivational homogeneity (as in Tullock’s
portrayal of bureaucrats as a set of uniform ‘economic men’) or motivational heterogeneity (as
in Downs’ portrayal of bureaucrats as a set of diverse personality types) are disregarded in
Niskanen’s analysis.7 Motivational homogeneity is derived in effect for Niskanen’s modelling
purpose because even though he accepted that bureaucrats pursue a range of objectives, he also
presumed that the objectives within a bureaucrat’s utility function can be folded into a single
objective: to maximise budgets. Thus, whereas Tullock and Downs attempted to account for
the selection mechanism and endogenous effects of bureaucratic institutions on the preferences
of rational agents, Niskanen’s budget-maximising model exclusively views bureaucratic
institutions as exogenous constraints on homogenous utility-maximisers. Nonetheless,
Niskanen’s ‘shallower’ institutional configuration afforded him greater analytical tractability
to model bureaucratic behaviour with respect to output decisions and thereby to compare the

7

For institutional selection of bureaucrats with different motivations in Tullock’s and Downs’ theories of
bureaucracy see sections 3.3 and 4.3 respectively.
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resulting output levels with those realised in profit-maximising firms.8 It is to this model that I
now turn.
5.4 Niskanen’s Budget-Maximising Model
Niskanen’s conceptual framework, underpinned by the key analogy of the theory of the firm,
gives rise to his famous model of the budget-maximising bureau with operational, and hence
testable, relationships. The bureau’s budget-maximising output is presented as an equilibrium
outcome arising from bargaining between the bureau’s sponsor and the chief bureaucrat. It is
thereby, in part, determined by the sponsor’s perceived benefit from the bureau’s output
(measured by the sponsor’s willingness to outlay budget and represented by a parabolic budgetoutput function) and the minimum total cost of inputs (represented by a monotonically
increasing cost-output function). Niskanen presented these functions thus:
"

𝐵 = 𝑎𝑄 − 𝑏𝑄! , 0 ≤ 𝑄 < !#

(4.1)

𝑇𝐶 = 𝑐𝑄 + 𝑑𝑄! , 0 ≤ 𝑄

(4.2)

The sponsor knows his or her own budget-cum-benefit schedule (4.1) but is oblivious to the
cost structure faced by the bureau (4.2) due to the information asymmetry discussed in the
previous section. The sponsor therefore cannot determine whether the bureau’s output is Pareto
efficient, that is, if marginal social benefit equals marginal social cost (𝐵$ (𝑄) = 𝑇𝐶′(𝑄)). The
lump-sum nature of the bargaining between the bureau and the sponsor (which is discussed in
the previous section) means that the chief bureaucrat can effectively present his or her proposal
to the sponsor in a ‘take-it-or-leave-it’ fashion. This allows the opportunistic chief bureaucrat
to choose an output that maximises the bureau’s budget, subject to the constraint that this
budget covers the total cost of production (𝐵 ≥ 𝑇𝐶). Niskanen (1971, p. 47) presented this
outcome in two different scenarios using marginal relationships, as shown in Figure 4 below.

8

This in part explains the rhetorical success of his 1971 book in the economics profession. See section 5.5 below.
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Figure 4. Equilibrium output of Niskanen’s (1971, p. 47) budget-maximising bureau

The first scenario is referred to as the “budget-constrained” scenario and occurs when the
marginal benefit, 𝐵’(𝑄)% , is low and elastic relative to the marginal cost. The optimal output
that maximises the sponsor’s net benefit (triangle G) is 𝑄& . However, given the incentives and
knowledge problems presumed, the chief bureaucrat requests a larger budget consistent with
the output at 𝑄∗ , such that the positive net benefit between zero and 𝑄& equals the negative net
benefit between 𝑄& and 𝑄∗ (i.e., triangle G = triangle H). This output maximises the budget
without exceeding total minimum costs and hence it is an equilibrium outcome that is allocative
inefficient but operationally efficient. In Niskanen’s (1971, p. 47) language, there is no ‘fat’ in
the bureau. The second scenario is referred to as the “demand-constrained” scenario and occurs
when the marginal benefit, 𝐵’(𝑄)! , is high and inelastic relative to marginal cost. In this
scenario, the sponsor’s marginal benefit falls to zero before the total budget just covers total
minimum cost. The chief bureaucrat therefore requests a budget to produce an output that
satiates the sponsor and exceeds the minimum total cost of that output. There is thus ‘fat’ to
exploit, and bureaucrats generate ‘X-inefficiency’ (via perks and other indirect rewards) to
exhaust the budget. The resulting equilibrium output is therefore both allocative and
operationally inefficient. In essence, the bureaucrats in Niskanen’s model exploit their bureau’s
monopoly power and the information asymmetry to raise output to the point where the social
surplus from the provision of public service is completely absorbed in financing the bureau’s
production costs and the bureaucrats’ non-monetary utilities.
Niskanen’s model leads to the significant hypothesis that bureaus are generally too large. That
is, both the budget and output of a bureau are larger than optimal given the collective demand
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for their services as represented by the sponsoring body (Niskanen, 1971, p. 50).9 To put it
even more precisely, at the equilibrium budget and output, the marginal value of the bureau’s
service to the sponsor (and the constituents that it represents) is lower than the marginal cost.
This is seen in both the ‘budget-constrained’ and the ‘demand-constrained’ scenarios
considered by Niskanen (analysed immediately above), since in either scenario the bureau
overproduces its output to yield a Pareto inefficient outcome. In fact, Niskanen (1971, pp. 59–
65) demonstrated that under some static conditions a bureau’s output would be twice the
competitive output. Niskanen’s hypothesis, if true, would entail the important policy
implication that there will always be efficiency gains for substituting bureaucratic supply with
competitive market supply (Conybeare, 1984, p. 485).
5.5 Niskanen’s Economic Method and Rhetoric
Niskanen’s Chicago training in neoclassical economics induced him to believe that good
economic models should be simple, parsimonious, and yield hypotheses that can be empirically
corroborated. Thus, like Downs, he adopted a more conventional positivist methodology to
justify his conceptual framework compared to Tullock’s Weberian method of understanding.10
He nonetheless adopted strategies associated with the latter to a greater extent than would be
expected in the work of a neoclassical economist at this time. He does this by advancing
“personal observations” and “casual evidence” to support his hypotheses, while also leaving
the critical empirical tests for others to complete (Niskanen, 1971, p. 8). In an approach
Niskanen (1971, p. 8) called “subjective empiricism” he asked the reader to introspectively
consider the following questions: “Is this behavioral hypothesis consistent with my personal
observation and understanding? Does this theory help organize my observations about related
phenomena?”. Anecdotal accounts of bureaucratic behaviour are therefore employed,
including several relating to the mismanagement of the Vietnam war and the US military
generally (e.g., Niskanen, 1971, pp. 76, 111). As already suggested, however, Niskanen’s key
rhetorical strategy is his metaphorical re-description of bureaucracy as a peculiar variant of a
neoclassical firm that is amenable to the standard equilibrium analysis of neoclassical
economics. The way this analogy served as the catalyst for the formalisation of Niskanen’s
model specifically and EOB generally cannot be understated. Consider two ways it captures
9

Interestingly, whereas scholars in sociology and public administration usually claim that an organisation’s
bureaucratic traits are the result of its large size, the analysis of EOB implies just the opposite— the largeness of
bureaucracy is in fact derived from its bureaucratic form of governance and production.
10

On Tullock’s and Downs’ method and rhetoric see sections 3.5 and 4.5, respectively.
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the imagination of formally trained economists.
The analogy of the firm enables trained economists to view the unfamiliar domain (bureaucracy)
in terms of a more familiar domain (the neoclassical firm). This, in turn, allows the economist’s
knowledge about the neoclassical firm to serve as an analogical model to generate a structure
of understanding to comprehend the unfamiliar terrain of bureaucracy (see Bicchieri, 1988, p.
107; Cohen, 1993; Lewis, 1996, p. 493). Niskanen’s simplifying assumption that bureaus
maximise budgets is central to making this analogical leap. This is because familiar
neoclassical assumptions, concepts, and techniques employed in the modelling of market
organisations – such as marginalism, twice differentiable utility and cost functions, constrained
optimisation, stable preferences, equilibrium analysis, Pareto efficiency, and so on – can be
readily carried over to the modelling of bureaus once the bureau’s budget-maximising objective
is seen as analogous to the firm’s profit-maximising objective.11 Niskanen (1971, p. 9) himself
conveyed the way formal techniques of neoclassical economics naturally follow once a single
maximand is assumed when he stated that his theory “involves the use of some simple
mathematics, primarily because I do not know of any other way effectively to analyze and
express what are, basically, maximization problems”. Readers who have been successfully
drilled in undergraduate neoclassical economics are, in short, more amenable to Niskanen’s
vision of bureaucracy because it resembles a legitimate conceptual framework that they already
understand and accept as worthy.
Niskanen’s analogy between the activities within the bureau and those within the neoclassical
firm is, by extension, embedded in a larger analogy between mid-Victorian mathematical
physics (especially mechanics and energy physics) and the neoclassical framework broadly
conceptualised. This larger analogy was identified by several historians of economic thought,
such as Philip Mirowski (1984, 1989) and Michael White (2004). They argued that the midVictorian neoclassical pioneers drew upon the concepts, models, and techniques then used in
mathematical physics to translate political economy into a closed and self-equilibrating system
of mathematical equations. They further argued that this analogy helped entrench neoclassical
economics as the dominant economic paradigm because mathematical physics was then the

11

Niskanen (1971, p. 42) also briefly considered models in which firm managers seek to maximise something
other than profits (such as revenue or ease) subject to constraints and suggests that these too create a ‘form’ of
model that is relevant to the bureau. This suggests that Niskanen was also possibly inspired by the debates
mentioned in the previous chapters from the late 1950s and early 1960s relating to the theory of the firm (see
section 2.5).
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ascendant natural science and hence it was taken as exemplifying what social science was
meant to look like (see also Hoover, 1991; De Marchi, 1993). 12 Neoclassical economics
subsequently evolved in the twentieth century, via a quest to achieve mathematical formalism,
into a research program with a core defined by axioms of maximising behaviour, stable
preferences, and market equilibrium (Becker, 1976, p. 5; Boettke, 1996). This broader analogy
is now largely taken for granted (at least outside history of economics circles) and hence it is
what McCloskey (1983, p. 503) called a dead metaphor; that is, it is a metaphor or analogy
entrenched in a scientific discipline for so long that it is now rarely recognised as such, and
hence the rhetorical force of its original imagery is lost. It is certainly likely that Niskanen and
his readers with economic training were oblivious to it. It is nonetheless another possible reason
why economists are so ready to see bureaucratic organisations through Niskanen’s lens – albeit
a less important reason compared to the primary analogy of the theory of the firm – since many
still associate the image of economics with what this lens presents.
5.6 Niskanen’s Influence and Conclusion
Niskanen’s EOB vision diverges dramatically from the visions advanced by Tullock and
Downs. It entailed a shift in focus from an internal principal-agent problem that causes
distortions in the coordination of self-interested bureaucrats within an organisation’s hierarchy
to an external principal-agent problem that allows a self-interested chief bureaucrat to exploit
a passive sponsor by oversupplying the bureau’s output. It also entailed replacing the strategy
of using selection mechanisms to determine the dominant bureaucratic motivation with the
strategy of folding the multiple objectives of the bureaucrat into a single maximand, which, in
turn, effectively yields motivational homogeneity. Finally, it entailed a dramatic shift in the
nature of the model building from a non-mathematical and process-driven approach to a
mathematical and equilibrium-economics approach. Niskanen’s budget-maximising model
was the key product of this vision. It was readily accepted by many readers not only because it
seemed to provide a plausible explanation for at least part of the growth in the bureaucratic
provision of government services since the Second World War, but also because it involved
drawing an analogy between the theory of the firm and the operation of a bureaucracy. The

12

It was possibly entrenched by the rhetoric of physics envy (i.e., if it is good enough for physics, it is good
enough for economics), or the rhetoric of exclusion (i.e., the employment of complex techniques excludes
criticisms from ill-trained amateurs), or it yielded plausible models, or all of these. Authors such as Mirowski and
White also suggested that the analogy is spurious and hence neoclassical economics has poor foundations. I take
no position in relation to these claims. My position is, once again, that analogies employed in EOB yielded useful
models by presenting particulars in a different light, but some models unfortunately overshadowed others.

74

Chapter 5: William Niskanen
rhetorical impact of the latter analogy was especially powerful amongst those drilled in
neoclassical economics because, at least in part, this is what they had been trained to accept as
the most suitable way to model the production of goods and services.
Niskanen’s budget-maximising bureau subsequently dominated both the EOB conversation
and, to a lesser extent, the related secondary literature in political science and public
administration. The evidence for this is overwhelming. According to Google Scholar (as of
January 2022), Niskanen’s 1971 monograph has been cited 11,500 times, which clearly dwarfs
the 2,492 citations of Tullock’s 1965 monograph and 7,630 citations of Downs’ 1967
monograph. Most of these citations appear in articles devoted to criticising Niskanen’s model
or extending it in such a way to make it more plausible. The nature of these criticisms need not
detain us long partly because they were published outside the timeframe set for this thesis topic;
partly because they have already been the subject of comprehensive surveys;13 and mostly
because, for the purpose of this thesis, they are important less because of the nature of their
criticisms or extensions and more because they signal the way Niskanen’s model suddenly
dominated the EOB conversation. But to give a brief overview, Niskanen’s critiques usually
turn on the implausibility of a completely passive sponsor (Bendor, et al. 1987; McCubbins &
Schwartz, 1984; Miller & Moe, 1983; Thompson, 1973; Weingast & Moran, 1983); the
possibility that the bureau faces competition from other bureaus in delivering output rather than
acting as a monopoly (Conybeare, 1984); the likelihood that some non-monetary utilities of the
chief bureaucrat are negatively related to a larger budget (Dunleavy, 1985; Johnson & Libecap,
1989; Peacock, 1978); the need to consider maximands other than the bureau’s budget (Breton
& Wintrobe, 1975; Gonzalez & Mehay, 1985; Migué et al., 1974; Peters, 1978/2001; Wyckoff,
1990a, 1990b); the implausibility that bureaucrats are so narrowly self-regarding that they do
not consider the public interest (Kogan, 1973; Margolis, 1975); and the failure to model the
bureau within a more general equilibrium system involving legislatures, voters, and special
interest groups (Chang et al., 2001; Moe, 1997; Peacock, 1992).
The voluminous and extensive debate surrounding Niskanen’s budget-maximising model
clearly signals the dominance of his model as the state-of-the-art intellectual product that had
to be accepted or critiqued.14 It became the root branch for the subsequent path-dependent
13
See Orzechowski (1977), Bendor (1988), Rowley and Elgin (1988), Moe (1997), Wintrobe (1997), and
Niskanen (2001).
14

For a later appraisal of Niskanen’s model see The Budget-Maximizing Bureaucrat: Appraisals and Evidence edited
by Blais and Dion (1991).
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evolution of EOB in the 1970s and 1980s. On the other hand, the models presented by Tullock
and Downs that highlighted internal bureaucratic processes, such as selection mechanisms and
hierarchical coordination, were cut off as future branches of research in EOB. Indeed, Tullock
and Downs are usually cited in the introductions to EOB narratives only to convey that they
provided preliminary economic analyses of bureaucratic organisations that were eventually
superseded by Niskanen (Mueller, 2003, p. 362; Rowley & Elgin, 1988, p. 267). It is also
Niskanen’s model, rather than Tullock’s or Downs’ models, that is cited in microeconomics
and public finance textbooks (e.g., Browning & Browning, 1994; Gwartney et al., 2011;
Musgrave & Musgrave, 1989; Rosen & Gayer, 2010; Ulbrich, 2011). The image of a bureau
as a neoclassical firm clearly played a role in generating this dominance. Tullock (1992, p. 1)
himself later admitted that his model was made “partially obsolete” by Niskanen’s model,
though he lamented that several of his theoretical insights have not been integrated into the
EOB literature.15 In any case, the success of the Niskanian approach led to the legitimisation
of EOB as a bona fide field of economic inquiry, even though it also led to the marginalisation
of important insights in Tullock’s and Downs’ account.

15

There were, however, isolated efforts in the 1970s and 1980s, such as Breton and Wintrobe (1982), to make the
internal hierarchy central to the analysis (see footnote 11 in section 3.3 above).
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In the preceding chapters I traced the historical evolution of EOB in the years shortly after its
initial founding, which constituted its golden age, from the mid-1960s through to the early
1970s. The three main contentions advanced in the introductory chapter to this thesis served to
guide the historical narrative and the attendant analysis of the key EOB texts. First, it was
contended that the focus and analytical content of EOB in its golden age was shaped by its
intellectual milieu or context. This milieu-cum-context included the existing conversations
relating to bureaucracy within earlier scholarly traditions and the conversation that eventually
emerged between EOB pioneers themselves. Second, it was contended that each of the key
EOB pioneers in the golden age deployed traditional economic techniques to develop
conceptual frameworks in which bureaucrats are depicted as self-interested agents who pursue
their objectives within non-market bureaucracies, but that these frameworks also diverged in
important ways whenever each pioneer emphasised different institutional and behavioural
features that characterise bureaucracies. It was, for example, proposed that the conceptual
frameworks advanced by Tullock and Downs focused attention on an internal principal-agent
problem that underpinned their hierarchical-distortion models, while the conceptual framework
advanced by Niskanen focused attention on an external principal-agent problem that
underpinned his budget-maximising model. Third, it was contended that Niskanen’s budgetmaximising model dominated EOB by the early 1970s due, in part, to the superior rhetoric he
employed, and that this success caused the insights of the other EOB pioneers to be neglected.
The evidence from published sources that was employed in the preceding chapters to map the
evolution of EOB largely corroborated these contentions. These findings could be enriched in
future research by drawing on the unpublished manuscripts of the EOB pioneers held in U.S.
archives (which have yet to be accessed due to the Covid travel restrictions) and the testimonies
of their near contemporaries in the EOB field who are still alive. Additional data of this sort
may also require adjustments to the key contentions at the margins. This line of research would
certainly need to be pursued if this exercise was a doctoral rather than a masters project. Still,
given the published texts at hand, the key contentions advanced in the preceding traditional
historical narrative have been largely corroborated. The evidence for the three main contentions
are now considered in turn.
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Contention One: Context Matters
The evidence marshalled demonstrates that the focus and analytical content of EOB was shaped
by the scholarly conversations that preceded it. The brief review in chapter two of the
depictions of bureaucracy within various intellectual traditions reveals a dialectical sequence
of ideas that formed the initial historical context in which the EOB advanced their visions. First,
it was shown that Adam Smith employed the method of comparative institutional analysis to
show that more welfare is generated in society when individuals pursue their self-interests in
free markets rather than in bureaucratic organisations that face little competitive pressure and
enjoy exclusive political rents. Smith’s comparative institutional approach and proto-EOB
insights were marginalised when economics took a neoclassical turn, but his key insights reemerged in the wake of the public choice revolution (Aligică et al., 2019, p. 37) and were
reflected in the works of the EOB pioneers (though often without citing Smith).1 Second, it
was shown that although Mill shared many of Smith’s beliefs, he believed that a merit-based
bureaucracy was an important component in any democracy designed to allow individuals to
flourish. This belief was compounded in the Progressive era when the conceptions of
bureaucracy advanced by Wilson and Weber were used to promote the idea of an efficient and
benign administrative state. Many economists, especially in public finance and welfare
economics, accepted this normative, even romantic, vision. The EOB pioneers, by contrast,
took this vision as their point of departure to advance their own accounts based on the
assumption that bureaucrats are self-interested. Finally, it was shown that the Austrian
economists identified several negative unintended consequences of bureaucratic planning
during the socialist calculation debate in the 1920s and 1930s, but their focus on the
bureaucrat’s inability to allocate resources efficiently due to knowledge constraints (rather than
the bureaucrat’s self-interest) limited their influence within the public choice movement
generally. Several Austrian elements nonetheless featured in the early works of EOB. For
instance, the non-market feature of bureaucracy emphasised by the Austrians was central to the
early EOB frameworks, and, as emphasised in chapter three, Tullock acknowledged that
reading Mises inspired his process-driven analysis of the coordination problem within nonmarket bureaucratic hierarchies.

1
Downs (1967, p. 2), for instance, cited Smith only once to indicate that he was following the “tradition of
economic thought” in modelling bureaucrats as motivated by their own self-interests like all other individuals in
society.
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The evidence presented in three case studies devoted to the key EOB pioneers also suggested
that their immediate environments and the conversation that developed between them shaped
the early evolution of EOB. For example, evidence of the involvement of Tullock and Downs
in the founding of public choice signalled the way that EOB was initially conceived within this
sub-discipline. Like the public choice economists, the EOB pioneers were also clearly
concerned with the rapid growth of the state, especially the growth of those components with
which they had personal experience via RAND and their public service experiences. This
concern included, in the case of Downs and Niskanen, an increasing anxiety over the waste
within the military industrial complex (especially in relation to the excesses of the Vietnam
War venture). The cross-referencing and acknowledgments that were identified in the early
EOB texts also signalled that a conversation eventually emerged between EOB pioneers
themselves and that this conversation, in turn, shaped the subsequent development of the EOB
frameworks. Finally, and linked to the third contention considered further below, evidence was
presented to show that the EOB pioneers deployed rhetorical strategies to render their
conceptual frameworks plausible to the target audience of this period (usually economists
trained in the neoclassical price theory). There was, in fact, evidence to suggest that several
immediate historical and intellectual forces shaped the path-dependent trajectory of EOB.
Contention Two: The Reconstruction of the EOB Conceptual Frameworks
The essayist G. K. Chesterton (1909, p. 204) remarked that “the whole object of travel is not
to set foot on foreign land; it is at last to set foot on one’s own country as a foreign land”. The
reconstruction of the early forays by the EOB pioneers in the largely unexamined terrain of
bureaucracy certainly provides a fresh appreciation of the features that are potentially neglected
in the modern EOB ‘homeland’, if not the modern economics ‘homeland’ more broadly.
Specifically, the textual evidence presented to recover the EOB conceptual frameworks
demonstrated that the driving principle common to the visions of the early EOB theorists
(namely, Tullock, Downs, and Niskanen) is that bureaucrats are rational economic agents who
pursue their self-interest in a non-market environment and in such a way that they do not serve
the stated objectives of their organisation, and, by extension, the public interest. In other words,
they rejected the then prevailing normative, even romantic, notion of the impartial and efficient
bureaucrat and, without using these words themselves, emphasised the principal-agent problem
writ large in a bureaucracy. The early EOB theorists also either explicitly (in the case of
Tullock) or implicitly (in the case of Downs and Niskanen) employed Weber’s method of
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understanding to render their propositions plausible. They co-joined this approach with more
positivist methods via a division-of-labour strategy in which empirical tests could be
undertaken by others in the future. A Weberian style of reasoning was thereby ironically used
to challenge the prevailing Wilsonian-Weberian ideal of bureaucracy. Their ultimate objective
was to present ‘bureaucracy without romance’ in the same way that the wider public choice
movement sought to present ‘politics without romance’.
It was also shown that even though each EOB pioneer deployed the economic axiom of rational
self-interest to analyse bureaucratic behaviour, there were significant, striking, and instructive
variations in their EOB visions. Tullock focused on the coordination of activities within a
bureaucracy. He accepted that agents pursue a range of objectives in their quest to maximise
utility, but, due to an adverse selection mechanism that exists in non-market or political
environments, contended that bureaucrats are more likely to pursue the self-regarding objective
of ascending a hierarchy. It is on this basis that he concluded that bureaucrats send false signals
through the hierarchy to serve their interests rather than the objectives of the organisation. Thus,
Tullock’s vision entails motivational homogeneity and an internal principal-agent problem.
Downs, like Tullock, focused on the coordination of activities within a bureaucracy. He also
accepted that agents pursue a range of objectives in their quest to maximise utility, but, due to
a dynamic selection mechanism that alters over the life cycle of the bureau, proposed that
different types of bureaucrats dominate the bureau at different stages of its life cycle. He added,
however, that even though not all of these bureaucratic types pursue self-regarding objectives,
the majority are still inclined to send false signals through the hierarchy to serve their interests
(altruistic or otherwise) rather than the objectives of the organisation. Thus, Downs’ vision
entails motivational heterogeneity and an internal principal-agent problem. Niskanen focused
on the exchange between the chief bureaucrat and the sponsor. He too accepted that agents
pursue a range of objectives in their quest to maximise utility, but, because these objectives
may be reconfigured as instruments to achieve a single objective, contended that chief
bureaucrats may be modelled as budget-maximisers. It is on this basis that he proposed that
bureaus supply output beyond the social optimal. Thus, Niskanen’s vision entails motivational
homogeneity in effect and an external principal-agent problem.
Contention Three: The Importance of Rhetoric and Niskanen’s Ascendency
Evidence was also presented to demonstrate that the three EOB pioneers used different
analogies to render their propositions plausible. It was shown that Niskanen’s ‘neoclassical
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firm’ analogy was by far the most effective of these. This analogy conveyed that Niskanen’s
budget-maximising model is congruent with what was then (and now) accepted as economic
science. That is, those readers who had been drilled in undergraduate economics required little
imagination and cognitive effort to recognise the budget-maximising model as economic
theory (and plausible theory at that) because the equilibrium and marginalist analysis,
comparative statics, mathematical formalism, and other neoclassical techniques used in its
construction had become naturalised in the discipline by the 1960s. The non-mathematical and
process-driven accounts presented by Tullock and Downs, by contrast, did not resonate with
economics trained readers. These accounts were, for example censured for their lack of
formalism (Niskanen, 2012; Williamson, 1967b) and advancing models that are not part of the
public choice tradition (Mueller, 2003, p. 362). The contrast between the visions presented by
Niskanen and his two predecessors was especially captured in the case study chapters by
focusing attention on the degree of sophistication of the diagrams they each deployed in
Cartesian space, with Tullock’s ‘television test patterns’ (as Niskanen dismissively puts it) and
Downs’ tree and territorial diagrams appearing feeble to the economist compared to the
Niskanen’s neoclassical diagram showing optima via marginal curves.
Finally, it was shown that although Niskanen’s budget-maximising framework was a
significant breakthrough in the history of EOB and shed valuable light on certain bureaucratic
pathologies if certain conditions are present, the way it dominated subsequent EOB research
marginalised the useful insights and questions advanced by Tullock and Downs. Specifically,
the initial research efforts to investigate the internal “politics of bureaucracy” (Tullock, 1965,
p. 10) that involve a “realistic grasp of the actual relationships between bureau environments
and bureau behavior” (Downs, 1967, p. 41) were displaced by Niskanen’s goal of designing a
neoclassical-style model to show how self-interested chief bureaucrats maximise their utility
by supplying equilibrium levels of output that are socially inefficient. In other words, Niskanen
shifted the explanandum of EOB from the internal behaviour of bureaus – particularly the
coordination problem and the selection effects of bureaucratic institutional structure – to the
way chief bureaucrats negotiate with external parties to supply different levels of equilibrium
output under different conditions. The external principal-agent problem thereby displaced the
internal principal-agent problem, and the early insights concerning the life cycle of the bureau,
motivational heterogeneity, selection processes, and hierarchical distortion were rendered
irrelevant.
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